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Delegation, Deference and 
Difference: In Search of a Principled 
Approach to Implementing and 
Administering Aboriginal Rights 
Janna Promislow 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2017, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) decided two duty to 
consult cases, heard together: Clyde River (Hamlet) v. Petroleum Geo-
Services Inc.1 and Chippewas of the Thames First Nation v. Enbridge 
Pipelines Inc.2 (“the 2017 cases”). Within the issue of whether the duty to 
consult had been satisfied, key points of contention focused on who is 
responsible for discharging the duty to consult Indigenous Peoples, 
including assessing the adequacy of the consultation. The cases presented 
the particular situation of a regulatory agency (the National Energy Board 
or NEB) that had final approval authority, without the involvement of the 
Crown “proper” (understood as a minister of the Crown or cabinet). In 
other words, can the duty be satisfied without the Crown participating in 
the process and assessing its adequacy? The Court’s answer: “While the 
Crown always owes the duty to consult, regulatory processes can partially 
or completely fulfill this duty.”3 A second, equally contentious issue was 
about what is required of a regulatory agency in assessing the obligation to 
consult when this obligation rests with it. Embedded within this issue is the 
                                                                                                                       
 Associate Professor, Thompson Rivers University, Faculty of Law. This paper evolved 
and was improved through discussions at the Osgoode Constitutional Cases Conference and the 
National Roundtable on Administrative Law, held by the Canadian Institute for the Administration 
of Justice. Thanks to Sonia Lawrence for her wise editorial advice and to Scott Robertson and Ben 
Ralston for their insights and comments. 
1 [2017] S.C.J. No. 40, 2017 SCC 40, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 1069 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Clyde 
River”]. 
2 [2017] S.C.J. No. 41, 2017 SCC 41, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 1099 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Chippewas of the Thames”]. 
3 Clyde River, supra, note 1, at paras. 1 and 30; Chippewas of the Thames, id., at para. 1. 
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question: what is the degree of specificity or formality with which the 
existing or claimed Aboriginal or treaty rights must be treated for the duty 
to assess adequacy to be discharged? The Court’s answer:  
An agency will not “always [be] required to review the adequacy of 
Crown consultation by applying a formulaic ‘Haida analysis’…. Nor will 
explicit reasons be required in every case. The degree of consideration 
that is appropriate will depend on the circumstances of each case.”4  
“[W]here deep consultation is required and the issue of Crown consultation 
is raised” with the agency, the agency “will be obliged to ‘explain how it 
considered and addressed’ Indigenous concerns … What is necessary is an 
indication that the [agency] took the asserted Aboriginal and treaty rights 
into consideration and accommodated them where appropriate.”5 
The Court’s answers to these key questions are responsive but also 
equivocal, particularly when the statements of principle are paired with 
their application in the two cases. The answers also open a host of new 
questions, such as the circumstances under which the responsibility of 
the agency is full or partial; how Indigenous peoples (and others 
interested in the regulatory processes in issue) are supposed to be 
apprised of variable distributions of responsibility for obligations owed 
to them, particularly given the retrospective answer to this question in 
Chippewas of the Thames; the mechanisms and processes of Crown 
intervention in regulatory processes; and when agency responsibility 
requires more or less explicit treatment of the right.  
Although these questions deserve further attention,6 as does the 
evaluation of the 2017 cases for the contributions to the duty to consult 
law more generally,7 the discussion that follows will focus on how the 
                                                                                                                       
4 Clyde River, id., at para. 42. 
5 Chippewas of the Thames, supra, note 2, at para. 63. 
6 For some discussion, see Nigel Bankes, “Clarifying the parameters of the Crown’s duty 
to consult and accommodate in the context of decision-making by energy tribunals” (December 
2017) J. of Energy & Natural Resources L. 1 [hereinafter “Bankes”] and Dwight Newman, 
“Changing Duty to Consult Expectations for Energy Regulators: Broader Implications from the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s Decisions in Chippewas of the Thames and Clyde River” (2017) 5 Energy  
Regulation Quarterly, online: <http://www.energyregulationquarterly.ca/articles/changing-duty-to- 
consult-expectations-for-energy-regulators-broader-implications-from-the-supreme-court-of-decisions-in-
chippewas-of-the-thames-and-clyde-river#sthash.BQufO0w0.dzR0Hx36.dpbs> [hereinafter “Newman 
2017”]. For a discussion of how these decisions relate the obligations and authority of municipalities 
with respect to the duty to consult and accommodate, see Felix Hoehn and Michael Stevens, “Local 
Governments and the Crown’s Duty to Consult” (2018) 55 Alta. L. Rev. (forthcoming). 
7 See John Borrows, “How Colonialism Works in Canada: Consultation, Clyde River and the 
Chippewas of the Thames”, Draft Paper, 2018 (on file with author) [hereinafter “Borrows”] and 
Richard Stacey, “Honour in Sovereignty: Can Crown Consultation With Indigenous Peoples Erase 
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2017 cases relate to the treatment of constitutional rights in administrative 
and discretionary contexts more generally. Active debate regarding the 
current framework for the review of administrative discretion implicating 
Charter8 rights and values,9 as well as tribunal jurisdiction over 
constitutional questions and remedies more generally,10 suggest that these 
matters are far from settled. Nevertheless, there are well-established 
policy groundings for the Charter frameworks. Judicial review in the 
context of administering Charter rights is aimed at governmental 
accountability for meeting its constitutional obligations by ensuring that 
Charter responsibilities and Charter rights enforcement is part of the 
work of the administrative branch. Such an approach aims to make 
Charter rights accessible to the rights-holders. As McLachlin J. (as she 
was then) famously stated in Cooper v. Canada (Human Rights 
Commission):11  
... The Charter is not some holy grail which only judicial initiates of the 
superior courts may touch. The Charter belongs to the people. … Many 
more citizens have their rights determined by … tribunals than by the 
                                                                                                                       
Canada’s Sovereignty Deficit?” (2018) 68 U.T.L.J. 405 [hereinafter “Stacey”]. For related discussion, 
see also Gordon Christie, “Developing Case Law: The Future of Consultation and Accommodation” 
(2006) 39 U.B.C. L. Rev. 139 and E. Ria Tzimas, “To What End the Dialogue?” (2011) 54 S.C.L.R. 
(2d) 493 and Kaitlin Ritchie, “Issues Associated with the Implementation of the Duty to Consult and 
Accommodate Aboriginal Peoples: Threatening the Goals of Reconciliation and Meaningful 
Consultation” (2013) 46 U.B.C. L. Rev. 347. 
8  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
9 As set out in Doré v. Barreau du Québec, [2012] S.C.J. No. 12, 2012 SCC 12, [2012] 1 
S.C.R. 395 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Doré”]; Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2015] 
S.C.J. No. 12, 2015 SCC 12, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Loyola”]. For commentary, 
see Audrey Macklin, “Charter Right or Charter-Lite? Administrative Discretion and the Charter” 
(2014) 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 561 [hereinafter “Macklin”]; Lorne Sossin & Mark Friedman, “Charter 
Values and Administrative Justice” (2014) 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 391 [hereinafter “Sossin & Friedman”]; 
Matthew Lewans, “Administrative Law, Judicial Deference, and the Charter” (2014) 23 
Constitutional Forum Constitutionnel 19; Evan Fox-Decent & Alexander Pless, “The Charter and 
Administrative Law Part II: Substantive Review” [hereinafter “Fox-Decent & Pless”] in Colleen M. 
Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds., Administrative Law in Context, 3d ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery 
Publications, 2018) 507 [hereinafter “Flood & Sossin”]; and Mary Liston, “Administering the 
Charter, Proportioning Justice. Thirty-Five Years of Development in a Nutshell” (2017) 30 CJALP 
211 [hereinafter “Liston”]. 
10 See, e.g., Nicholas Lambert, “The Charter in the Administrative Process: Statutory 
Remedy or Refounding of Administrative Jurisdiction?” (2007-2008) 13 Rev. Const. Stud. 21 
[hereinafter “Lambert”]; Beth Bilson, “The Voice from the Trenches: Administrative Tribunals and 
the Interpretation of the Charter” (2006) 69 Sask. L. Rev. 3; Deborah K. Lovett, “Administrative 
Tribunal Jurisdiction Over Constitutional Issues and the New Administrative Tribunals Act” (2005) 
63 Advocate 177 [hereinafter “Lovett”]; and Fox-Decent & Pless, id. 
11 [1996] S.C.J. No. 115, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 854 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cooper”]. 
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courts. If the Charter is to be meaningful to ordinary people, then it 
must find its expression in the decisions of … tribunals.12  
In Paul v. British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission), the Supreme 
Court brought this same direction to tribunal jurisdiction regarding 
section 3513 rights challenges, stating that “[t]here is no persuasive basis 
for distinguishing the power to determine s. 35 questions from the power 
to determine other constitutional questions. … Section 35 is not, any 
more than the Charter, ‘some holy grail which only judicial initiates of 
the superior courts may touch’ ....”14 But the 2017 cases do not take their 
cue from Paul and instead introduce several points of difference from the 
Charter context. Paul was decided before Haida Nation v. British 
Columbia (Minister of Forests)15 foregrounded consultation and the 
honour of the Crown in relation to section 35 interests. It is time to 
revisit Paul and consider whether the assertion of there being “no 
persuasive basis” to distinguish the administration of section 35 rights 
from Charter rights still holds true given the evolution in tribunal 
authorities and responsibilities for Charter protections and section 35 
jurisprudence since this case. 
Starting from the policy motivations behind the frameworks in the 
Charter context, this paper will consider the 2017 cases and identify two 
main points of Indigenous difference.16 The first is in respect of the 
framing of tribunal jurisdictions over constitutional rights, where 
“delegation” to tribunals through legislation applies in Charter contexts 
while the 2017 cases introduce an element of Crown “reliance” on 
tribunals into this interpretive exercise. The second area of difference is 
in the review of decisions violating or implicating constitutional rights, 
and particularly the application of the reasonableness standard with 
respect to values (Charter context) and claimed rights (section 35 
                                                                                                                       
12 Id., at para. 70. Aspects of Cooper on tribunal jurisdiction over Charter challenges to its 
enabling legislation were later overturned, and adopting McLachlin J.’s words in Nova Scotia 
(Workers’ Compensation Board v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Laseur, 
[2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Martin”]. See also R. v. Conway, 
[2010] S.C.J. No. 22, 2010 SCC 22, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 765 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Conway”]. 
13 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
14 [2003] S.C.J. No. 34, 2003 SCC 55, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 585, at para. 36 (S.C.C.) (citations 
omitted) [hereinafter “Paul”]. 
15 [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Haida 
Nation”]. 
16 With apologies to Patrick Macklem for potentially bending his 2001 book title out of 
shape from his original use of this term to refer to socio-economic and historical differences, rather 
than differences of treatment in the law as I am using it here: Patrick Macklem, Indigenous 
Difference and the Constitution of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001). 
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context) that have not yet crystallized as rights or as rights that have been 
violated. The paper will demonstrate that to some extent, Indigenous 
difference in the administration of constitutional rights and obligations 
might reflect narratives of Crown and Indigenous treaty relationships, 
ongoing questions about Crown sovereignty, and the premise that 
negotiated solutions to section 35 rights disputes and claims are 
preferred.17 Such narratives already provide a purposive grounding for 
the duty to consult and accommodate. This paper will explore whether 
they also provide a purposive (and principled) grounding for understanding 
the posture and approaches the Court should adopt in judicial review of 
administrative decisions that implicate section 35 rights. In spite of such 
differences, my main argument will be that an approach of “difference” is 
unsupported by any purposive or historical differences between section 35 
and Charter rights, and instead undermines processes of reconciliation 
that the duty to consult is intended to support. Even taking into account 
rigorous debate and cautions relating to the evolving framework for 
review of decisions breaching Charter rights under a “reasonableness as 
proportionality” standard,18 I nevertheless suggest that applying the same 
judicial review principles relating to the intersection of constitutional and 
administrative law would better protect the rights-quality of section 35 
rights than the directions coming out of the 2017 cases. Ultimately, the 
motivating policies for the Charter approaches are equally pressing in the 
section 35 context: the adjudication of section 35 rights must be made 
accessible to Indigenous rights-holders. 
The paper will start with a brief overview of the cases and the factual 
differences emphasized by the Supreme Court to reach different results 
for the Indigenous parties. I will then turn to consider how the Court’s 
treatment of the role of administrative tribunals in the duty to consult and 
accommodate is different from the treatment of tribunal jurisdiction and 
responsibility for Charter rights and other constitutional issues, first with 
respect to the jurisdiction of tribunals over constitutional questions; and 
second, with respect to proportionality in reasonableness review of 
administrative decisions impacting constitutional rights protections. With 
respect to each of these aspects of tribunal responsibility and authority 
                                                                                                                       
17 Such themes are long-standing in the s. 35 jurisprudence — R. v. Sparrow, [1990] S.C.J. 
No. 49, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sparrow”] and Delgamuukw v. British 
Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C) [hereinafter “Delgamuukw”]. This 
orientation also relates to the history of s. 35; see note 70, below. 
18 As discussed in the materials noted, supra, note 8 and discussed in detail in Part III.2, 
below. 
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over constitutional matters, I will try to make sense of these differences, 
searching for purposes and reasons that can explain the differences and 
identifying absences of principle. Finally, I will conclude by considering 
principled directions for the development of this law.  
II. THE CASES 
The 2017 consultation cases involved similar regulatory structures 
vis-à-vis the role of the Crown, but were otherwise quite dissimilar. In 
Clyde River, the Inuit of the Nunavut hamlet contended with 
international oil and gas companies (the “proponents”) who were seeking 
a geophysical operations authorization (“GOA”) from the National 
Energy Board to conduct seismic testing in Baffin Bay and Davis Strait 
under section 5 of the Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act.19 The 
seismic testing in issue is known to have impacts on marine mammals, 
including the seals and narwhal that are part of the country food diet the 
Inuit of the area continue to rely on. The marine mammals are also the 
subject of treaty rights under the Nunavut Land Claim Agreement,20 
including priority Inuit harvesting rights and commitments to Inuit 
participation in wildlife management decisions and resource management 
that sustains and restores depleted wildlife populations.21 The GOA 
decision was subject to a proponent-led environmental assessment 
process that did not require a panel hearing. The proponent did a poor job 
of responding to Inuit questions about the testing, posting practically 
inaccessible and long documents only after community consultation 
meetings.22 While organizations representing Inuit contacted the Minister 
of Aboriginal and Northern Affairs specifically requesting a strategic 
environmental assessment (SEA) prior to issuance of the GOA, the 
Minister declined to delay the GOA to allow this broader environmental 
assessment process to take place first.23 The NEB thus issued the GOA to 
the proponents without significant participation from a Minister of the 
Crown. On judicial review, Karakatsanis and Brown JJ., writing for the 
full Court, found that the consultation process was significantly flawed 
and quashed the GOA. 
                                                                                                                       
19 R.S.C. 1985 c. O-7 [hereinafter “COGOA”]. 
20 Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Canada, May 25, 1993 [hereinafter “NCLA”]. 
21 Id., articles 5, 15, 16, esp. 5.1.2-5.1.6, 16.1.3 
22 Clyde River, supra, note 1, at para. 49. 
23 Id., at para. 13. 
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In Chippewas of the Thames, treaty harvesting rights were also in issue, 
but this time arising from a series of historic treaties dating from the early 
19th century. Beyond the scope of these treaties, the Chippewas of the 
Thames First Nation also claim Aboriginal title to the riverbed of the 
Thames River and an Aboriginal right to use the water of the Thames 
River.24 Enbridge Pipelines Inc. proposed a pipeline modification project to 
reverse the flow of part of its 40-year-old Line 9 pipeline to move eastward 
from Sarnia to Montreal, and also increase its capacity and allow it to carry 
diluted bitumen or heavy crude. The project was subject to approval under 
section 58 of the National Energy Board Act,25 an authority that allows the 
NEB to issue a final approval of smaller pipeline projects without the 
involvement of the federal cabinet. The Chippewas of the Thames and other 
First Nations were notified about the project by Enbridge and then 
participated in the environmental assessment hearing process conducted by 
the NEB. The Chippewas of the Thames First Nation also sent letters to the 
Prime Minister and other Cabinet Ministers prior to the NEB hearings 
raising concerns, including that no Crown-led consultation had occurred 
with respect to the proposed project. They called on the Ministers to initiate 
consultations. A response was received only after the NEB hearing process 
was concluded, during which the Chippewas of the Thames and other First 
Nations presented their concerns about the impacts of the proposed project 
on their lands, livelihoods and heritage. The ministerial response, received 
only after the hearing concluded, was to the effect that the Crown would rely 
on the NEB’s process to fulfil its duty to consult on the project. The NEB 
thus approved the Line 9 project without direct participation of the Crown. 
In this case, the Supreme Court (again with Karakatsanis and Brown JJ. 
writing) found that the duty to consult and accommodate had been satisfied 
and upheld the approval. 
The Court’s treatment of the administrative law issues in these cases 
was given short shrift in favour of a focus on the merits: was the duty to 
consult met in each of the cases? The absence of the administrative law 
notably aligns with recent discussions in the jurisprudence urging judicial 
review to focus on the merits of the cases rather than the abstract 
intricacies of judicial review.26 This absence, however, is also a notable 
                                                                                                                       
24 Factum of the Chippewas of the Thames First Nation, at para. 13. Additional rights claims 
included Aboriginal rights to access and preserve sacred sites and a treaty right to exclusive use and 
enjoyment of Reserve lands; summarized by the SCC, Chippewas of the Thames, supra, note 2, at para. 7. 
25 R.S.C. 1985, c. N-7 [hereinafter “NEB Act”]. 
26 For example, Abella J. in Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., [2016] S.C.J. No. 29, 
2016 SCC 29, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 770, at para. 25 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Wilson”]. 
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departure from previous cases addressing the fit of the duty to consult 
with regulatory processes. Unlike in Haida Nation; Carrier Sekani 
Tribal Council27 and Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First 
Nation,28 there were no overtures to the utility and flexibility of 
administrative law to absorb and address the issues and context of the 
duty to consult. Further, there was no mention of deference or the 
standard of review in either judgment, an absence that demonstrates 
what Paul Daly has described as the compelling inconsistency of the 
standard of review doctrine.29 Perhaps the absence demonstrates that it 
was easier for the Supreme Court to agree on the merits of these cases 
than the standards of review and what they mean. Regardless of the 
motivations, the Court’s discussion of what constitutes meaningful 
consultation, particularly in Clyde River, is significantly more 
directive than its treatment of the administrative law issues. 
Nevertheless, the lack of explicit treatment does not mean these cases 
lack administrative law significance.  
III. INDIGENOUS DIFFERENCE AND THE 2017 CASES 
1. Reliance and the Premises of Deference 
(a) Identifying Indigenous Difference 
On the administrative law issues, the 2017 cases pick up issues addressed 
in the 2010 decision, Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, which set out that “[t]he 
legislature may choose to delegate to a tribunal the Crown’s duty to 
consult”30 and in addition, or alternatively, “the legislature may choose to 
confine a tribunal’s power to determinations of whether adequate 
consultation has taken place, as a condition of its statutory decision-making 
process.”31 The latter authority depends on expressed or implied authority in 
the legislation over questions of law, following the course established in 
Martin and Paul regarding tribunal authority to decide questions of 
                                                                                                                       
27 Carrier Sekani Tribal Council v. Rio Tinto Alcan, [2010] S.C.J. No. 43, 2010 SCC 43, 
[2010] 2 S.C.R. 650 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Carrier Sekani Tribal Council”]. 
28 [2010] S.C.J. No. 53, 2010 SCC 53, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Little 
Salmon/Carmacks First Nation”]. 
29 Paul Daly, “Why is Standard of Review So Addictive?” Blog: Administrative Law Matters 
(February 12, 2018), online: <http://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2018/02/12/why-is-
standard-of-review-so-addictive/>. 
30 Supra, note 27, at para. 56. 
31 Id., at para. 57. 
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constitutional law. The former authority depends on the remedial powers 
discernible from the legislation and specifically that a tribunal with authority 
to engage in consultation must “possess remedial powers necessary to do 
what it is asked to do in connection with the consultation”,32 following the 
course established in Conway regarding tribunal jurisdiction to grant Charter 
section 24 remedies.33 
The 2017 cases confirmed the approach from Carrier Sekani Tribal 
Council. However, taking its cue from the arguments of several of the 
parties,34 the Supreme Court also added new glosses to these established 
approaches. Tribunal authority was repackaged as a matter of Crown 
reliance on tribunal processes rather than a matter of legislative 
delegation of authority to administrative tribunals: 
The Crown may rely on a regulatory agency in this way so long as the 
agency possesses the statutory powers to do what the duty to consult 
requires in the particular circumstances. ... However, if the agency’s 
statutory powers are insufficient in the circumstances or if the agency 
does not provide adequate consultation and accommodation, the Crown 
must provide further avenues for meaningful consultation and 
accommodation in order to fulfill the duty prior to project approval.35 
Is this new language significant? Is it different to switch the focus of 
the analysis from the agency, to whom legislatures might intend to 
delegate an obligation (or be assumed to intend absent an explicit 
withdrawal of authority), to the Crown, whose duty lies outside and 
beyond legislation, and who might rely on administrative agencies to assist 
with the carrying out of the Crown’s obligations?36 In a word, yes.37  
Under the reliance theory, new questions arise. For example, how 
might Indigenous parties (or proponents for that matter) be expected to 
                                                                                                                       
32 Id., at para. 60. 
33 For discussion, see Janna Promislow, “Irreconcilable? The Duty to Consult and Administrative 
Decision Makers” (2013) 22 Constitutional Forum Constitutionnel 63 [hereinafter “Promislow 2013”]. 
34 See, e.g., the facta of the Respondent Attorney General for Canada, and of the Appellants 
Chippewas of the Thames First Nation and The Hamlet of Clyde River. 
35 Chippewas of the Thames, supra, note 2, at para. 32 (emphasis added and citations omitted). 
36 The language of reliance was not brand new in these decisions. It has been part of the 
federal policy guidelines on the duty to consult since at least 2011 (Department of Aboriginal Affairs 
and Northern Development Canada, Aboriginal Consultation and Accommodation – Updated 
Guidelines for Federal Officials to Fulfill the Duty to Consult (March 2011), online: 
<http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100014664/1100100014675>). It was also used by the 
Federal Court of Appeal in Hamlet of Clyde River v. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. ASA (TGS), 
[2015] F.C.J. No. 991, 2015 FCA 179 (F.C.A.). 
37 For a more limited view of what the cases decided, although without analysis of the 
language of reliance, see Newman 2017, supra, note 6. 
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know about Crown’s intention to rely on the regulatory process in a 
given case? The Court’s answer was that “where the Crown relies on the 
processes of a regulatory body to fulfill its duty in whole or in part, it 
should be made clear to affected Indigenous groups that the Crown is so 
relying.”38 Any potential stringency of such a requirement was, however, 
immediately undermined by the application of these principles in 
Chippewas of the Thames, in which efforts to engage the Crown 
separately from the NEB hearing process were not answered until after 
the NEB had approved the Line 9 project. Instead, the Court considered 
the NEB’s early notice of the hearing process along with knowledge  
that the NEB was the final decision-maker in the matter and that the 
Crown was not a participant in the process, to have “made it sufficiently 
clear to the Chippewas of the Thames that the NEB process was intended 
to constitute Crown consultation and accommodation.”39 Intended by 
whom, one wonders — Parliament or the Crown? Under Carrier Sekani 
Tribal Council (and Martin, Paul and Conway), the role of the tribunal 
vis-à-vis the duty to consult was a question of legislative intent. In 
Chippewas of the Thames, the question of reliance became one of 
constructive Indigenous party knowledge and maybe Crown and/or 
legislative intent. This is different. It is premised on different facts and a 
different kind of inquiry, such that the well-trodden principles of 
discerning and respecting legislative intent in these circumstances may 
prove to be of limited assistance in spite of the centrality of these 
principles in Carrier Sekani Tribal Council and the rest of public law. 
(b) Explaining and Evaluating this Difference 
To address the potential friction between the premises of deference 
and the concept of Crown reliance on regulatory process, we must first 
understand the non-delegable quality of the honour of the Crown. The 
non-delegable quality of the honour of the Crown was first addressed in 
the seminal Haida Nation decision. Among the issues decided in that 
case was whether Weyerhaeuser Company Ltd., a non-governmental 
party proponent and beneficiary of the government conduct in question, 
bore legal responsibility for the duty to consult. The Supreme Court held 
unambiguously it did not:  
                                                                                                                       
38 Clyde River, supra, note 1, at para. 23. See also Chippewas of the Thames, supra, note 2, 
at para. 44. 
39 Chippewas of the Thames, id., at para. 46 (emphasis added). 
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[T]he duty to consult and accommodate … flows from the Crown’s 
assumption of sovereignty over lands and resources formerly held by the 
Aboriginal group. This theory provides no support for an obligation on 
third parties to consult or accommodate. The Crown alone remains 
legally responsible for the consequences of its actions and interactions 
with third parties, that affect Aboriginal interests. The Crown may 
delegate procedural aspects of consultation to industry proponents 
seeking a particular development; this is not infrequently done in 
environmental assessments. … However, the ultimate legal responsibility 
for consultation and accommodation rests with the Crown. The honour of 
the Crown cannot be delegated.40 
This statement was in relation to the issue of third party liability,41 
distinct in both tone and content from the commentary the Supreme 
Court offered at the time, in both Haida Nation and the companion case 
Taku River Tlingit First Nation,42 on how the duty would be integrated 
with the existing regulatory state. In that commentary, it was equally 
clear that the Supreme Court envisioned the duty being carried out within 
existing regulatory structures, and even offered a hopeful note that 
governments might “set up regulatory schemes to address the procedural 
requirements appropriate to different problems at different stages, 
thereby strengthening the reconciliation process and reducing recourse to 
the courts.”43 In these statements, the Court in Haida Nation did not 
suggest that the duty cannot be delegated in the administrative law sense 
of the word.44 Indeed, Carrier Sekani Tribal Council confirmed that even 
accommodation  the substantive element of the duty  may be 
delivered by administrative bodies, although only to the extent that is 
consistent with the remedies available within the pertinent statutes.45 
Thus, the non-delegable quality of the constitutional principle of the 
                                                                                                                       
40 Haida Nation, supra, note 15, at para. 53. 
41 The obligations of third parties in private law in relation to interference with Aboriginal 
title specifically are currently being litigated in relation to the tort of nuisance; see the dismissal of 
the application for summary judgment in Saik’uz First Nation and Stellat’en First Nation v. Rio 
Tinto Alcan Inc., [2015] B.C.J. No. 694, 2015 BCCA 154 (B.C.C.A.). 
42 Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), [2004] 
S.C.J. No. 69, 2004 SCC 74, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Taku River Tlingit First Nation”]. 
43 Haida Nation, supra, note 15, at para. 51. 
44 The one point of connection is the reference to the “procedural” aspects as the delegable 
part of the duty, whether to third parties or the regulatory bodies that are part and parcel of 
“government” if not the Crown. This point that deserves further attention, particularly in light of the 
Supreme Court’s insistence in Tsilhqot’in Nation of the duty as procedural in nature, leaving the 
substantive elements of accommodation to other elements within the justification analysis. For 
discussion of the procedural nature of the duty to consult, see Stacey, supra, note 7. 
45 Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, supra, note 27. 
148 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
honour of the Crown46 is akin to the applicability principles under section 
32 of the Charter that have been interpreted to mean that the Charter does 
not govern disputes between private parties directly.47 Further, it is 
distinct from the administrative law principles, which demand the 
opposite: obligations that flow from the honour of the Crown must bind 
administrative agencies so that government cannot avoid constitutional 
obligations simply through legislative delegations.48  
In the 2017 version of these principles, the Supreme Court described 
the Crown as always holding “ultimate responsibility for ensuring 
consultation is adequate.”49 This statement does not mean that the duty 
cannot be delegated. It also does not mean that the regulatory process 
cannot fully satisfy the constitutional obligations in a given case.50 
Nevertheless, if it is to mean anything, it means that the duty cannot be 
fully or completely delegated without some Crown oversight. This 
language suggests that the Crown must be aware of consultation 
processes and must be confident in them and/or evaluate the adequacy of 
consultation administered through regulatory processes. As Karakatsanis 
and Brown JJ. explained, this awareness does not have to be at the 
granulated level of each individual consultation process with each 
Indigenous community:  
[A] minister of the Crown [is not required to] give explicit consideration 
in every case to whether the duty to consult has been satisfied, … [nor 
are they required to] directly participate in the process of consultation. 
Where the regulatory process being relied upon does not achieve 
adequate consultation or accommodation, the Crown must take further 
measures to meet its duty. This might entail filling any gaps on a 
case-by-case basis or more systemically through legislative or regulatory 
amendments .... Or, it might require making submissions to the 
regulatory body, requesting reconsideration of a decision, or seeking a 
postponement in order to carry out further consultation in a separate 
process before the decision is rendered. And, if an affected Indigenous 
group is (like the Inuit of Nunavut) a party to a modern treaty and 
                                                                                                                       
46 Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, supra, note 28, at para. 42. 
47 Dolphin Delivery v. Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580, [1986] 
S.C.J. No. 75, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 (S.C.C.); Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 
558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., [2002] S.C.J. No. 7, 2002 SCC 8, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 
156 (S.C.C.). 
48 Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] S.C.J. No. 43, 2000 
SCC 44, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Blencoe”]; Godbout v. Longueuil (City), [1997] 
S.C.J. No. 95, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Godbout”]. 
49 Clyde River, supra, note 1, at para. 22; Chippewas of the Thames, supra, note 2, at para. 37. 
50 For discussion, see Newman 2017, supra, note 6. 
(2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d) DELEGATION, DEFERENCE AND DIFFERENCE 149 
perceives the process to be deficient, it should, as it did here, request such 
direct Crown engagement in a timely manner (since parties to treaties are 
obliged to act diligently to advance their respective interests).51 
The ultimate responsibility of the Crown is thus connected to a 
conversation with Indigenous parties, who are expected to make the 
Crown aware of the procedural deficiencies of at least specific regulatory 
processes.  
Perhaps out of a concern to not overstep its proper competence and 
inappropriately and inadvertently overburden government, the Court was 
vague on what is required of government in its “ultimate responsibility” 
role. The onus to bring the inadequacies of regulatory consultations to 
the Crown’s attention in a particular case clearly lies with Indigenous 
Peoples, with no corresponding obligation on the Crown to respond. This 
feather-light onus on the Crown to anticipate and be deliberate in its 
engagements with consultation through the regulatory processes creates 
additional hurdles for Indigenous parties seeking recognition and 
accommodation of their constitutional rights. Not requiring specific 
attention by the Crown  or, as we will see in the next section, tribunals 
either  to the implementation and assessment of Aboriginal rights also 
bolsters arguments that the duty facilitates assimilation rather than 
reconciliation.52 This approach also does not, as Richard Stacey argues it 
should, promote the duty to consult as a vehicle for state accountability 
to Indigenous Peoples.53 But for my purposes in this paper, the focus is 
on the implications of a reliance approach to section 35 constitutional 
responsibilities, as opposed to the tried-and-true delegation approach for 
the Charter.  
The most significant innovation in the reliance framework flows from 
a change in the role of legislative intent. In the Charter context, 
delegation to adjudicate rights and the extent of section 24(1) remedial 
authority depends on legislative intent, while responsibilities to uphold 
Charter rights and values flow from the application of the Charter to 
tribunals under section 32 and section 52.54 Government can choose to 
organize the adjudication of rights by removing Charter jurisdictions 
from particular tribunals, but it is questionable whether legislatures can 
remove responsibilities to attend to Charter values in decision-making 
                                                                                                                       
51 Clyde River, supra, note 1, at para. 22 (citations omitted). 
52 See authors cited in supra, note 6. 
53 Stacey, supra, note 7. 
54 Conway, supra, note 12. 
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from tribunals.55 In relation to the Charter and in administrative law more 
generally, legislative intent is a cornerstone for understanding the scope 
of authorities and obligations entrusted to administrative agencies and 
actors of all sorts and the role of the courts on judicial review.56 
Switching to the section 35 context, the Crown’s ability to rely on 
regulatory processes is determined through a mix of Crown and 
legislative intent. Moreover, the Crown’s ultimate authority for the 
adequacy of consultation  pinned to a non-delegable constitutional 
principle, the parameters of which I suggest above have been 
inappropriately extended in the context of administrative law  suggests 
there can be no legislative intent to fully delegate the duty, or at least not 
the obligation to assess adequacy and make up for any missing elements. 
Instead, the statements in Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames 
create a constitutional limitation on legislative intent, such that some 
constitutional responsibilities cannot be delegated, even where questions 
of law are clearly within tribunal authority (such as in the case of the 
NEB in the 2017 cases).  
To be clear, this is more of a theoretical or structural problem than a 
functional one. The constitutional limitation does not undermine the 
ability of regulatory agencies to fully carry out the duty. Instead, it 
changes point of inquiry from one of what legislatures intended ahead of 
a particular process to a mostly retrospective focus on what the executive 
did and intended in relation to a particular process. The Crown, rather 
than the legislature, must determine the fullness of the agency’s process 
in relation to the satisfaction of constitutional obligations. This point of 
Indigenous difference inverts of the usual hierarchies of law and policy, 
putting the Crown in the driver’s seat and limiting the control of the 
legislature.57 By potentially re-orienting judicial review to a distinct 
Crown decision to rely or not rely on regulatory decisions and 
                                                                                                                       
55 See, e.g., Ismail v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), [2013] B.C.J. No. 1308, 
2013 BCSC 1079 (B.C.S.C.): “A direction in the legislation that a tribunal has no jurisdiction to 
decide constitutional questions relating to the Charter should not be viewed as a direction that the 
tribunal should ignore Charter values” (at para. 309). See also Duncan v. British Columbia (Human 
Rights Tribunal), [2017] B.C.J. No. 2651, 2017 BCSC 2375, at paras. 60-101 (B.C.S.C.). 
56 A key point of debate in this area has been whether it is constitutional for legislatures to 
remove consideration of the Charter from the fulfilment of legal responsibilities. For commentary 
see Lambert, supra, note 10, and Fox-Decent & Pless, supra, note 9. 
57 This is itself problematic. For related analysis see Janna Promislow & Naiomi Metallic, 
“Realizing Aboriginal Administrative Law” [hereinafter “Promislow & Metallic”] in Flood & 
Sossin, supra, note 9, at 87; and Kate Glover Berger, “Diagnosing Administrative Law: A Comment 
on Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames First Nation” (2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d) 107. 
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processes,58 this point also aggravates a dynamic noted by commentators 
in relation to judicial review of ministerial decisions affecting Charter 
rights and values under which courts defer to government actors who 
may be “inclined to trade off individual rights in the name of political 
gain.”59 This inclination is at least as strong in relation to Aboriginal 
rights, the protection of which often remains in juxtaposition or outside 
the conception of the public interest.60 It further throws a wrench in the 
workings of the usual administrative law theory of deference on top of an 
already confused and confusing application of standard of review logic to 
review of the duty to consult.61 The key issue emerging from this new twist 
is whether a tribunal can ever be presumed to be an expert in relation to its 
responsibilities over the duty to consult when legislatures are constitutionally 
barred from fully delegating these responsibilities to them.  
A more detailed review of the potential questions at stake within a 
judicial review of a decision on the duty to consult and accommodate will 
wait until the next section, below. The question at stake in the Crown’s 
particular, non-delegable role is adequacy, a question to which deference 
applies. As the Federal Court of Appeal explained in Gitxaala Nation: 
“When considering whether that duty has been fulfilled — i.e., the 
                                                                                                                       
58 The potential for this structure to create additional opportunities and decisions for judicial 
review was not treated by the Court in the 2017 cases. However, it was already present in the case 
law. See, e.g., Gitxaala Nation v. Canada, [2016] F.C.J. No. 705, 2016 FCA 187 (F.C.A.) 
[hereinafter “Gitxaala Nation”]; Prophet River First Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), [2017] 
F.C.J. No. 64, 2017 FCA 15 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter “Prophet River FCA”], leave to appeal to the 
Supreme Court denied [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 127 (S.C.C.); Prophet River v. British Columbia 
(Minister of the Environment), [2017] B.C.J. No. 182, 2017 BCCA 58 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter 
“Prophet River BCCA”], leave to appeal to the Supreme Court denied [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 127 
(S.C.C.). For a critique of this development, see Newman 2017, supra, note 6. 
59 Macklin, supra, note 9, at 574. For a similar point, in relation to the potential conflict 
inherent in relation to tribunals tasked with both the obligation to carry out the duty to consult and 
the obligation to assess the adequacy of consultation, as quasi-judicial and independent tribunals, see 
Bankes, supra, note 6. 
60 Clyde River addressed this issue, but indicating that the public interest is not supported by 
decisions that breach constitutionally protected rights (supra, note 1, at para. 40). But short of a 
determination of a breach of rights, it is unclear how the unresolved rights claims often at stake in 
the duty to consult impact the public interest. See, for example, the minority decision in Ktunaxa 
Nation v. British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations), [2017] S.C.J. No. 54, 
2017 SCC 54 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ktunaxa Nation”] (decided just after the 2017 consultation 
cases) and commentary in Naiomi Metallic, “Deference and Legal Frameworks Not Designed By, 
For or With Us” [hereinafter “Metallic”], The Dunsmuir Decade, a blog symposium hosted by Paul 
Daly (Administrative Law Matters) and Leonid Sirota (Double Aspect), (February 27, 2018), online:  
<http://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2018/02/27/deference-and-legal-frameworks-not- 
designed-by-for-or-with-us-naiomi-metallic/> [hereinafter “The Dunsmuir Decade”]. 
61 For a thorough discussion of the standard of review, see Nunatukavut Community Council 
Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] F.C.J. No. 969, 2015 FC 981, at paras. 79-94 (F.C.). 
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adequacy of consultation — we are not to insist on a standard of 
perfection; rather, only reasonable satisfaction is required.”62 But tribunals 
may still be responsible for assessing adequacy. Post-Clyde River and 
Chippewas of the Thames, should deference be applied to tribunal 
assessments of adequacy or just the Crown’s? To be clear, this issue is not 
addressed in the decisions. The Court skipped the discussion of deference 
altogether. However, the theory of ultimate Crown responsibility suggests 
deference to tribunals on these questions is not appropriate. It is possible to 
argue that the reliance theory does not remove delegation of the question 
of adequacy from tribunals, but rather adds a further layer of assessment 
on top of the delegation, and that this leaves in place the premises of 
legislative intent to delegate such matters to expert tribunals. But this 
argument fails to recognize the structural limit on tribunal authority put in 
place in Chippewas of the Thames and Clyde River. Related concerns are 
identified in United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 401 v. Alberta 
(Attorney General),63 in which the Alberta Court of Appeal noted that 
where constitutional jurisdictions have been explicitly removed by statute, 
the standard of review will be affected even when it is a discretionary 
decision at stake: 
The Administrative Procedures and Jurisdiction Act should not be 
viewed as a direction to Alberta tribunals that they should ignore Charter 
values. As Doré states at para. 35 “administrative decisions are always 
required to consider fundamental values”. But because the statute limits 
their power to directly resolve Charter issues by limiting their jurisdiction, 
the statute will necessarily influence the standard of review analysis 
relating to the tribunal’s decisions. As Doré points out at para. 30, the 
rule in Dunsmuir is based in part on legislative intent, and the intent of 
the Administrative Procedures and Jurisdiction Act is clearly that the 
excluded tribunals have a limited role to play in this area. … In all the 
circumstances, applying the four part test in Dunsmuir, the standard of 
review of the compliance of the decision of the Adjudicator with the 
Charter should be reviewed for correctness.64  
                                                                                                                       
62 Gitxaala Nation, supra, note 58, at para. 8. 
63 [2012] A.J. No. 427, 2012 ABCA 130, 349 D.L.R. (4th) 654 (Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter 
“UFCW (ABCA)”], affd Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. United Food and 
Commercial Workers, Local 401, [2013] S.C.J. No. 62, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 733, 2013 SCC 62 (S.C.C.) 
(standard of review was not discussed at the S.C.C.). Note, however, that there are differences 
among members of the Supreme Court on characterizing legislative intent through specific indicators 
that lead away from deference. See, e.g., Edmonton (City) v. Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping 
Centres Limited, [2016] S.C.J. No. 47, 2016 SCC 47, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 293 (S.C.C.). 
64 UFCW (ABCA), id., at paras. 42, 44. 
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The logic here is augmented in Clyde River and Chippewas of the 
Thames by the constitutional nature of the limitation on legislative intent. 
A legislature cannot intend a tribunal to be the expert on a matter that 
they are constitutionally restricted from fully or finally delegating to the 
tribunal.65 Thus in a move aimed at a different problem, the Supreme 
Court in Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames has arguably 
rebalanced the standard of review question in favour of correctness 
across all aspects of the duty to consult, at least when it is the decisions 
of a tribunal rather than a minister of the Crown being reviewed.66  
At a time when a potentially wholesale revisiting of the standard of 
review analysis is pending,67 and the role of correctness review is already 
in question,68 the relevance of these arguments may only be to reveal 
structural relationship between the executive, the legislature and the 
courts.69 But as an argument about how Aboriginal rights are 
implemented and administered, and how this differs from the Charter 
context, the structural point is nevertheless illuminating. It is difficult to 
imagine other contexts in the Canadian constitutional state in which a 
constitutional obligation be so anchored in the executive so as to place a 
                                                                                                                       
65 The 2017 cases are especially interesting in light of the evolving standard of review 
doctrines, in which the role of a contextual versus presumptive approach to legislative intent in 
relation to tribunal expertise continues to be debated; see the reasons of the majority and the 
concurring reasons of Brown J. in Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada 
(Attorney General), [2018] S.C.J. No. 31, 2018 SCC 31 (S.C.C.). 
66 See, e.g., Ktunaxa Nation, supra, note 60, in which the scope of consultation required 
was at the deep end of the scale, and the Supreme Court applied reasonableness to how the Minister 
conducted the consultation. For commentary, see Janna Promislow, “Deference with a Difference: 
Dunsmuir and Aboriginal Rights” [hereinafter “Promislow 2018”], The Dunmsuir Decade, supra, 
note 60. Since expertise rests with the Crown under the reliance theory, Chippewas of the Thames 
and Clyde River do not give rise to arguments that disturb the approach to deference in relation to 
decisions of ministers and their delegates. This raises the odd possibility that there should be 
deference to ministers on the same decisions where deference is not owed to tribunals. 
Administrative law since Dunsmuir has moved away from distinguishing between tribunals and 
other types of administrative decision-makers, such as ministers and their delegates. Applying 
deference to ministerial decision-makers but not tribunals is not a promising path to follow. 
67 As the Supreme Court has signalled in its leave decision on Bell Canada v. Canada 
(Attorney General), [2018] S.C.C.A. No. 9 (S.C.C.), and to be heard alongside National Football 
League v. Canada (Attorney General), [2018] S.C.C.A. No. 28 (S.C.C.) and Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 352 (S.C.C.). 
68 See comments of Abella J. in Wilson, supra, note 26, and commentary in The Dunsmuir 
Decade, supra, note 60. 
69 Indeed, structural characteristics of the relationships between the institutions of 
government and the balancing of legislative supremacy and the rule of law are what proponents of 
maintaining the correctness standard point to as its primary purpose. See, for example, the 
concurring reasons of Rowe and Côté JJ. in Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canada 
(Attorney General), [2018] S.C.J. No. 31, 2018 SCC 31, at para. 77 (S.C.C.). 
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limit on legislative action to reorganize how that constitutional obligation 
is carried out. While the ethereal limit imposed by the reliance theory 
does not allow the Crown’s conduct to displace legislation, the ever-
present and overarching responsibility of the Crown certainly nudges 
towards an inversion of the usual hierarchy of legislation displacing 
Crown prerogatives.70 This suggested inversion in turn reminds us that, 
unlike their Charter cousins, the Aboriginal rights protected by the 
Constitution Act, 1982 are not established by the text of section 35. 
Instead, the content and existence of section 35 rights was expected to be 
defined through further constitutional negotiations.71 In the wake of the 
failure of those post-1982 processes, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
has treated Aboriginal rights as rights that have to be proven, on a case-
by-case basis, while treaty rights give rise to litigation of both scope and 
application of the right, along with questions of existence.72 Only the 
former type of treaty right case is akin to what the Charter rights 
litigation attempts to determine.73 
In the 2017 cases, Indigenous parties argued for Crown responsibility 
in consultation processes. These arguments reflect their experiences of 
articulating concerns over threats to their treaty rights to whomever has 
been identified as the consultation partner, only to have their concerns 
bounced between proponent-agency-Crown without ever being directly 
addressed.74 Their arguments also reflect conceptions of treaties supporting 
nation-to-nation relationships. Indigenous nations have long viewed their 
treaty relationships as being with the Crown, referring to the monarch, and 
                                                                                                                       
70 Craig Forcese, “The Executive, The Royal Prerogative, and the Constitution” in Peter 
Oliver, Patrick Macklem & Nathalie Des Rosiers, eds., The Oxford Handbook of The Canadian 
Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017) 150, at 155-58. 
71 Douglas E. Sanders, “The Indian Lobby” in Keith Banting & Richard Simeon, eds., And 
No One Cheered: Federalism Democracy and the Constitution Act (Toronto: Methuen, 1983) 301, at 
320; Michael Woodward & Bruce George, “The Canadian Indian Lobby of Westminster 1979-1982” 
(Fall 1983) 18 J. of Cdn. Studies 119; Peter H. Russell, Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians 
Become a Sovereign People?, 2d ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), at 122, and 
Chapters 10, 11; Madeline Rose Knickerbocker & Sarah Nickel, “Negotiating Sovereignty: 
Indigenous Perspectives on the Patriation of a Settler Colonial Constitution, 1975-83” (2016) 190 
BC Studies 67 and Jeremy Webber, “After Patriation: Aboriginal Rights, Meech Lake, and 
Charlottetown, 1982-1992” in Reimagining Canada: Language, Culture, Community and the 
Canadian Constitution (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994) 122. 
72 Promislow 2013, supra, note 33, at 65. See also Prophet River FCA, supra, note 58, at 
para. 36. 
73 Sparrow, supra, note 17. 
74 As explained, for example, by Scott Robertson regarding the experience of the 
Chippewas of the Thames First Nation: “Pushing the Bounds of Administrative Law to Get Closer to 
Justice”, National Roundtable on Administrative Law, Ottawa, Ontario (June 2, 2018). 
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not with the administrative delegates and branches far removed (in theory, 
independent from) the head of state.75 A nation-to-nation relationship 
requires that treaty relationships be renewed and for ongoing negotiations 
of disputed matters.76 Decisions on important projects affecting Indigenous 
lands, waters, and resource use and the regulatory processes by which such 
projects are decided are undoubtedly matters that require discussion. If 
those discussions are understood as part of an ongoing treaty relationship, 
they are not just about a free-standing duty to consult, but about a 
continuation of a treaty relationship with more than a project-based 
foundation in consent.77 Moreover, the difference between “claimed” 
versus “proven or recognized” status at Canadian law does not change the 
nature of the treaty relationship or the connection between consultations 
and those treaty relationships. From such a perspective, allowing the 
Crown to rely on independent tribunals for all aspects of its treaty-based 
consultation obligations may jump too far ahead of the conversations that 
enduring treaty relationships require, particularly where the tribunal was 
not itself established in relation to treaty discussions and commitments.78 
The arguments of the Indigenous parties find some resonance with a 
structural perspective of what the reliance theory achieves, resonance 
that provides a glimmer of a reasoned basis for the Indigenous difference 
                                                                                                                       
75 For example, before patriation in 1982, Treaty First Nations brought an action in the 
United Kingdom arguing that the treaty obligations were still owed by the Queen in right of Her 
Government in the United Kingdom, in an attempt to block patriation: The Queen v. The Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte: The Indian Association of Alberta, Union of New 
Brunswick Indians, Union of Nova Scotian Indians, [1981] 4 C.N.L.R. 86 (U.K. C.A.). See also, 
“Constitution Express”, Indigenous Foundations, online: <https://indigenousfoundations.arts. 
ubc.ca/constitution_express/>; Clive Linklater et al., “The Constitution Story” (1982), Saskatchewan 
Indian, Constitution Special Edition 7, online: <http://www.sicc.sk.ca/archive/saskindian/a82apr04.htm>. 
76 For discussion, see Mark D. Walters, “Brightening the Covenant Chain: Aboriginal 
Treaty Meanings in Law and History After Marshall” (2001) 24 Dal. L.J. 75; John Borrows, 
“Ground-Rules: Indigenous Treaties in Canada and New Zealand” (2006) 22 N.Z.U. L. Rev. 188; 
James [Sa’ke’j] Youngblood Henderson, “Dialogical Governance: A Mechanism of Constitutional 
Governance” (2009) 72 Sask. L. Rev. 29; James Tully, “Consent, Hegemony, and Dissent in Treaty 
Negotiations” in Jeremy Webber & Colin M. Macleod, eds., Between Consenting Peoples. Political 
Community and the Meaning of Consent (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010) 
233 and Janna Promislow, “Treaties in History and Law” (2014) 47 U.B.C. L. Rev. 1085; and essays 
in John Borrows & Michael Coyle, eds., The Right Relationship: Reimagining the Implementation of 
Historical Treaties (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017). 
77 See, e.g., Myeengun Henry, “First Nation questions relationship with Canada following 
court ruling” Toronto Star (August 11, 2017), online: <https://www.thestar.com/opinion/ 
commentary/2017/08/11/first-nation-questions-relationship-with-canada-following.html>. 
78 There are many co-management and joint management boards that have a role in wildlife 
and resource decisions in Canada that have been created as a result of modern treaty or other 
negotiated relationship instruments; see, e.g., the McKenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review 
Board and the Haida Gwaii Management Council. 
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identified above. Treaty relationships have broken down, and cannot be 
repaired through project-based consultations with the Indigenous parties 
in which the Crown is not even present. On the flipside, from the 
perspective of state law, Canada’s authority has been described by the 
Supreme Court as (only) de facto,79 interpreted by many to denote a 
nascent or evolving quality to Canadian sovereignty, subject to or limited 
by the de jure status of continuing Indigenous sovereignties, at least until 
a point of reconciliation that may or may not be attainable in the 
foreseeable future.80 Relatedly, as Webber argues, the concept of 
sovereignty is not simply a historical fact; instead, the defining 
characteristics of sovereignty include relationality and ongoing dispute, a 
conceptualization that understands the Canadian state and Indigenous 
Peoples to “still [be] seeking forms of relationship that are adequate to 
our lives together.”81 
However, this point of principle — one that potentially connects to 
moments in prior jurisprudence that allowed for an openness in the 
conception of state sovereignty — is not sustained by the doctrinal 
directions in the 2017 cases. Those cases do not recognize the nation-to-
nation relationship or an open and disputed quality to Crown sovereignty 
that might potentially be supported through a different version of the 
reliance theory. The principles do not require the Crown to assess 
particular regulatory processes, let alone nurture the treaty relationship 
and discuss how to implement resource regulation with Indigenous 
nations. Equally concerning from the perspective of the mainstream of 
public law, the principles articulated do not require any action from the 
legislature to address the implementation and administration of 
Aboriginal and treaty rights. Contrary to the strong presumptions of 
authority over constitutional questions emerging from Martin and Paul — 
which, it should be noted, were followed by legislative action to 
                                                                                                                       
79 Haida Nation, supra, note 15, at para. 32. 
80 See, e.g., Felix Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties: Aboriginal Nations and Canada 
(Saskatoon: Native Law Centre, 2012) and Mark D. Walters, “The Morality of Aboriginal Law” 
(2006) 31 Queen’s L.J. 470-520. See also Stacey, supra, note 7; Jeremy Webber, “We Are Still in 
the Age of Encounter: Section 35 and a Canada Beyond Sovereignty” [hereinafter “Webber”] in 
Patrick Macklem & Douglas Sanderson, eds., From Recognition to Reconciliation: Essays on the 
Constitutional Entrenchment of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2016) [hereinafter “Macklem & Sanderson”]; Mark W. Walters, “Knots in the Bulrush: Law, 
Sovereignty and Aboriginal Rights” in Macklem & Sanderson, id., at 40; Brian Slattery, “Aboriginal 
Rights and the Honour of the Crown” (2005) 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 433; and Ryan Beaton, “De Facto and 
De Jure Crown Sovereignty: Reconciliation and Legitimation at the Supreme Court of Canada” 
(2018) 27 Constitutional Forum Constitutionnel 25. 
81 Webber, id., at 99. 
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withdraw and reorganize constitutional jurisdictions in at least two 
provinces82  the 2017 cases give the ability of the Crown to potentially 
“fix” consultation conducted through regulatory process but do not set 
any measures to assess Crown action or inaction in a given case apart 
from whether the consultation was, on judicial review, reasonable. The 
ability to retrospectively fix consultation through regulatory processes, 
combined with a lack of accountability for the Crown’s obligation to 
supervise or assess particular processes, is a recipe for government 
inaction, especially legislative inaction, on the duty to consult and on 
implementing and administering Aboriginal and treaty rights more 
generally. 
2. When Doré Met Haida Nation: Constitutional Rights, Values and 
“Unformulaic” Analyses of Rights Claims 
(a) Identifying Indigenous Difference 
A second point of Indigenous difference can be identified when we 
consider the judicial review principles that apply to ensure that where 
a discretionary administrative decision limits Charter protections, the 
impact is not disproportionate. This section will detail how the 
Supreme Court’s approach in the 2017 cases both align with these 
principles, as set out in Doré and Loyola, and departs from the more 
developed (albeit still evolving) principles applied in that context that 
are intended to ensure that constitutional rights are not impacted 
disproportionately. 
Above, the discussion focused on potential limitations to judicial 
deference in relation to review of tribunal and Crown assessments of the 
consultation process to ensure its adequacy. This is the third of three 
points of analysis established in Haida Nation. The two questions that 
precede the determination of whether the duty has been satisfied are: (1) has 
the duty to consult been triggered? (2) what is the scope or content of the 
duty? These two questions are questions of constitutional law, to date 
                                                                                                                       
82 Administrative Tribunals Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 45, ss. 44-45; Administrative Procedures 
and Jurisdiction Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-3, s. 11. It would be interesting to consider how to 
empirically support an argument about what judicial review principles should be to prompt or 
encourage governmental and legislative action to address such problems. In the absence of a stronger 
empirical basis, my argument here is premised on the relatively strong response elicited by Martin 
and the common law tradition of strong presumptions that the legislature can replace with explicit 
language in statutes (see, e.g., Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk (Regional) Police Commissioners, 
[1979] S.C.J. No. 88, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311 (S.C.C.)). 
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assessed on a correctness standard, while the third question of adequacy 
(satisfaction of the duty) is a matter more akin to administrative 
discretion and, to date at least, assessed on a reasonableness standard. 
Logically, questions 1 and 2 — whether the duty is triggered and the 
scope of the duty — must be answered before question 3. Without such 
attention, the level of consultation required remains undefined and the 
standard of reasonableness, if applied to the final question of adequacy, 
seeps into the first two questions. Even if correctness is not applied to the 
first two questions distinctly, a decision that proceeds on an erroneous 
assessment of the rights claimed and/or the impact of the proposed 
conduct on those rights, would necessarily be unreasonable.83  
In Clyde River, the Supreme Court accepted the scope of the duty as 
deep, but in Chippewas of the Thames, the question of the scope of the 
duty was not addressed by the NEB or the courts. And again, no mention 
of the standard of review that applied to such questions, or any distinction 
between a court’s role on review of the distinct questions was made. The 
parties argued that a tribunal that has jurisdiction to assess the adequacy of 
consultation must engage the analysis of the scope of the duty from Haida 
Nation, an analysis that requires assessing the rights claimed and not 
simply some generalized notion of Indigenous interests and environmental 
impacts at stake in the projects. In Clyde River, the Supreme Court 
provided a partial answer to these arguments when it considered that the 
NEB’s failure to consider the impact of the seismic testing on the Inuit 
treaty rights separately from the impact on the environment, also 
contributed to the failure of the consultation process. In the Court’s words,  
[T]he inquiry was misdirected. While the NEB found that the proposed 
testing was not likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects, 
and that any effects on traditional resource use could be addressed by 
mitigation measures, the consultative inquiry is not properly into 
environmental effects per se. Rather, it inquires into the impact on the 
right. No consideration was given in the NEB’s environmental assessment 
to the source — in a treaty — of the appellants’ rights to harvest marine 
mammals, nor to the impact of the proposed testing on those rights.84  
                                                                                                                       
83 Da’naxda’xw/Awaetlala First Nation v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2011] 
B.C.J. No. 887, 2011 BCSC 620 (B.C.S.C.) put it this way (at para. 147): 
In my view, this is a situation where the Crown misconceived the impact of the 
Minister’s decision, and … also misconceived the seriousness of the Da’naxda’xw’s 
claim. No deference should be given to the government’s decision to determine the issue 
under the 2010 Protected Area Policy. In these circumstances, the scope and adequacy of 
the consultation should be reviewed on a standard of correctness. 
84 Clyde River, supra, note 1, at para. 45 (emphasis in original). 
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While this passage emphasizes that the articulation of the impact of a 
project on rights as a distinct inquiry from the impact on the 
environment, it is only a partial answer to the parties’ arguments because 
the Court addresses this point in relation to the review of the process 
(adequacy) of consultation, and not the assessment of the scope of the 
duty.  
Further, had the same approach been applied in Chippewas of the 
Thames, the end result may not have changed, but the quality of the 
conversation required would have been considerably improved. This is 
because the Chippewas of the Thames First Nation claimed a number of 
rights (detailed above), including title to the riverbed, but the nature of 
these rights and strengths of the claims were not explored in the NEB’s 
assessment decision nor in the judicial reviews that followed. As 
Karakatsanis and Brown JJ. noted, “neither the NEB nor the Federal 
Court of Appeal assessed the depth of consultation required in this 
case.”85 The Supreme Court also did not engage in this analysis. Instead, 
the Supreme Court, like the NEB, emphasized the minimal “footprint” of 
the proposed project,86 and found the NEB’s hearing process and 
Aboriginal engagement initiatives (including participant funding) and 
mitigation measures required and committed to by the proponent 
Enbridge, satisfied the duty to consult and accommodate. Consequently, 
several of the First Nation’s rights claims were never addressed. This 
implicitly sanctions a risk management strategy whereby consultations 
and accommodations may exceed the requirements of the strict letter of 
the law. One does not actually know what the law requires of the 
proponent, a regulatory agency, or the Crown in these situations; only 
that the duty may be satisfied without any party responding to 
Indigenous concerns about the articulation of its scope. There may be 
practical advantages to glossing over the assessment of rights and 
impacts on rights in favour of richer consultation processes, particularly 
for rights claimants who have weak claims or who lack the resources to 
fully research and support their claims.87 Nevertheless, the risks of 
rights-avoidance are well demonstrated in Chippewas of the Thames. Not 
                                                                                                                       
85 Chippewas of the Thames, supra, note 2, at para. 47. 
86 National Energy Board, Reasons for Decision. In the matter of Enbridge Pipelines Inc. 
Application dated 29 November 2012 for the Line 9B Reversal and Line 9 Capacity Expansion 
Project, OH-002-2013 (March 2014) at 85-86, 97 [hereinafter “NEB Report, Line 9”]. 
87 For a related discussion of the pragmatics of “the creative use of ambiguity”, see Dwight 
Newman, Revisiting the Duty to Consult Aboriginal Peoples (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2014), 
at 169-71 [hereinafter “Newman, Revisiting”]. 
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only does this approach damage the meaningful conversation that the 
duty is intended to support, lack of attention to the impact on rights at 
even the third step of assessing the adequacy of consultation meant no 
attention to the difference between the title claim and traditional land use 
rights emphasized by the NEB and the courts. As the Supreme Court said 
in Tsilhqot’in Nation, “... Aboriginal title is a beneficial interest in the 
land .... In simple terms, the title holders have the right to the benefits 
associated with the land — to use it, enjoy it and profit from its 
economic development.”88 A focus on impacts on rights requires 
attention to the fact that a project with a small footprint has more obvious 
impacts on the use and benefit of land than on resource use rights.  
The partial answer from Clyde River regarding the obligation to 
address section 35 rights (and its non-application in Chippewas of the 
Thames) is rounded out by the Supreme Court’s statement that a 
“formulaic ‘Haida analysis’” is not always required of the tribunal.89 
This answer suggests that the constitutional rights at stake do not need to 
be addressed as questions of constitutional law by a regulatory agency 
with constitutional authority to assess the adequacy of consultation (as 
per Martin, Paul and Carrier Sekani Tribal Council). Although 
confusing at first — how can an authority delegated as a question of 
constitutional law not be reviewed on the same basis90 — the Supreme 
Court’s move away from treating constitutional questions that arise in the 
course of exercises of administrative discretion is in many ways 
consistent with the treatment of Charter rights and values as articulated 
in Doré, Loyola, and most recently, Law Society of British Columbia v. 
Trinity Western University.91 The consistency is found in that, like in the 
2017 cases, a reviewing court does not require that tribunals perform the 
Oakes justification analysis as a court would under the Doré/Loyola 
framework. To do so would be to impose court-like standards on 
sometimes very different administrative bodies, and risk opening the 
door to too much court intervention in administrative decisions. An 
overly interventionist court on judicial review is not respectful of 
legislative intent to delegate matters to administrative agencies in the 
first place, and this includes interventions on matters implicating Charter 
                                                                                                                       
88 Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] S.C.J. No. 44, 2014 SCC 44, [2014] 2 
S.C.R. 257, at para. 70 (S.C.C.) (citation omitted) [hereinafter “Tsilhqot’in Nation”]. 
89 Chippewas of the Thames, supra, note 2, at para. 63; Clyde River, supra, note 1, at para. 42. 
90 Recall that in Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, supra, note 27, the authority to assess 
adequacy depends on authority over questions of law. 
91 [2018] S.C.J. No. 32, 2018 SCC 32 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “LSBC v. TWU”]. 
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rights, particularly in administrative contexts where Charter rights are part 
and parcel of daily tribunal decisions.92 In other words, the invocation and 
presence of Charter rights within an administrative context does not 
transform the administrative context, nor usurp the significance of 
administrative expertise. Instead, constitutional rights and values require 
attention and respect from administrative decision-makers as part of their 
role in administering law and justice in the Canadian state. This is achieved 
under Doré by aligning the reasonableness standard with the section 1 
Oakes93 justification test to ensure that decision-makers have proportionally 
balanced “the relevant Charter value with the statutory objectives”.94  
At first glance, such logic applies equally well in Aboriginal rights 
and duty to consult contexts, in which boards such as the NEB and other 
environmental decision-makers that regularly recommend or approve or 
permit projects that will impact Indigenous Peoples’ lands, waters and 
land uses (and therefore, have probable impacts on Aboriginal and treaty 
rights). Moreover, as set out in Clyde River, even where deep 
consultation and reasons are required, the reasons do not have to be 
explicit “in every case. The degree of consideration that is appropriate 
will depend on the circumstances of each case.”95 This point was further 
elaborated in Chippewas of the Thames, which set out the requirement as 
“an indication that the [agency] took the asserted Aboriginal and treaty 
rights into consideration and accommodated them where appropriate.”96 
These points are also, at first glance, entirely consistent with Supreme 
Court articulations in Charter contexts, such as in LSBC v. TWU, in 
which reasons were not required of a decision-maker that used a 
referendum process of decision. Instead, the whole record can be 
examined to ensure that proportionate balancing was attended to in the 
decision process.97 Under Doré and Loyola, it is the whole decision that 
must satisfy the reasonableness standard, an approach that takes account 
of and respects diverse administrative contexts with valuable expertise 
by requiring judicial flexibility with respect to the form and specificity of 
the reasoning, even in relation to the justification of infringements of 
Charter rights.  
                                                                                                                       
92 For example, parole boards as discussed in Doré, supra, note 9, at para. 51, citing David Mullan, 
“Administrative Tribunals and Judicial Review of Charter Issues after Multani” (2006) 21 N.J.C.L. 127. 
93 R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). 
94 Doré, supra, note 9, at para. 58. See also McLachlin C.J.C.’s concurring reasons in LSBC v. 
TWU, supra, note 89, at para. 114 and critical and clarifying notes on the framework at paras. 115-119. 
95 Clyde River, supra, note 1, at para. 42. 
96 Supra, note 2, at para. 63. 
97 LSBC v. TWU, supra, note 91, at paras. 55-56. 
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Thus, even without citations to Doré and Loyola, the stipulation in the 
2017 cases that a “formulaic” rights-based Haida Nation analysis is not 
required might be seen as a meeting of the jurisprudence from Haida 
Nation and the Doré line of cases. However, it is only a passing 
resemblance, and the merger of these approaches far from complete. 
Upon further examination, by not addressing the distinct points of 
analysis involved in the middle question of scope, and assessing only the 
pragmatic end-point of the adequacy of the process, the Supreme Court set 
a course that again marks a point of Indigenous difference in public law.  
First, the analytic framework in the Charter context identifies a 
threshold step of determining whether a Charter protection has been 
limited before the proportionality analysis is engaged. As the majority in 
LSBC v. TWU reiterated, “the preliminary question is whether the 
administrative decision engages the Charter by limiting Charter 
protections – both rights and values”.98 The majority does not specify 
what this step involves, but in her concurring reasons, McLachlin C.J.C., 
presses on to suggest clarifications to the Doré/Loyola framework, 
including that a “decision based on an erroneous interpretation of a 
Charter right will be unreasonable.”99 Studiously avoiding the language 
of preliminary questions and correctness review, McLachlin C.J.C. 
emphasizes that there must be consistency in interpretation of 
constitutional rights regardless of whether it is courts or executive actors 
who are deciding whether a right has been limited or violated by 
government conduct. It is also a point that closely tracks McLachlin 
C.J.C.’s statement in Haida Nation (at least once one takes into account 
the evolution of standard of review since 2004), where she stated, that 
“[s]hould the government misconceive the seriousness of the claim or 
impact of the infringement, this question of law would likely be judged 
by correctness.”100 This threshold step of ensuring the breach of any 
rights or impacts on values at stake have been properly identified, 
however, is not present or required in the 2017 cases. It may be true that 
the Supreme Court saw no relevance or found no consensus to pursuing 
this analysis in Chippewas of the Thames, having been persuaded that the 
final outcome in that case was fair. Nevertheless, jumping over the 
distinct treatment of the right demonstrates the concern raised by critics 
                                                                                                                       
98 Id., at para. 58. 
99 Id., at para. 116. See also Liston, supra, note 9, at 233. 
100 Supra, note 15, at para. 63. Relatedly, McLachlin C.J.C. also stated in Haida Nation that 
“one cannot ‘meaningfully discuss accommodation or justification of a right unless one has some 
idea of the core of that right and its modern scope’” (at para. 36, citation omitted). 
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of Doré/Loyola:101 One cannot know if the impact on a right is 
proportional and therefore that a decision is reasonable if the constitutional 
interests at stake have not been fully and properly identified. 
Second, the lack of a threshold analysis focusing on the constitutional 
protections at stake in the 2017 cases is not only out of step with the 
Charter jurisprudence, it is also out of step with a growing line of lower 
court decisions that clearly require the Crown to carry out a preliminary 
assessment of rights. As the Federal Court said in Enge v. Canada 
(Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development): “The failure of 
the Crown to conduct a preliminary assessment of the strength of an 
Aboriginal claim, to determine the scope of the consultation required, 
and to discuss its preliminary assessment with the Aboriginal group in 
question can itself be a breach of the duty to consult.”102 And as the 
Ontario Superior Court stated in Saugeen First Nation v. Ontario 
(Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry): “The Crown was obliged 
to do an initial assessment. This is a requirement of constitutional stature. 
... ‘Scoping’ is also a requirement of constitutional stature.”103 In these 
cases, this constitutional requirement sits with the Crown, and is specific 
to particular consultations. If this obligation is not automatically 
delegated to agencies with their responsibilities over the duty to consult, 
and if the Crown, as ultimately responsible, is not required to specifically 
assess the scope of the duty (as discussed in the previous section), the 
potential for the Crown to evade its constitutional obligations through 
delegation is enlarged yet goes unremarked upon in the 2017 cases.104 
Alternatively, perhaps the reliance framework demarcates a different role 
for the Crown “proper”, setting directions for Aboriginal administrative 
law that are markedly different from the direction since Dunsmuir to treat 
all administrative decision-makers exercising statutory authorities 
through the same lens and principles.105 
                                                                                                                       
101 See, e.g., authors noted at supra, note 9. See also the separate concurring judgments of 
McLachlin C.J.C. and Rowe J. in LSBC v. TWU, supra, note 91. 
102 [2017] F.C.J. No. 963, 2017 FC 932, at para. 210 (F.C.), citing West Moberly First 
Nations v. British Columbia (Ministry of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources), [2011] B.C.J. 
No. 942, 2011 BCCA 247, at para. 113 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “West Moberly First Nations 
BCCA”]. This approach builds upon Stratas and Dawson JJ.A.’s comments in Gitxaala Nation, 
supra, note 58, at paras. 308-309. See also Kwakiutl First Nation v. North Island Central Coast 
Forest District, [2015] B.C.J. No. 1605, 2015 BCCA 345 (B.C.C.A.). 
103 [2017] O.J. No. 3701, 2017 ONSC 3456, at para. 54 (Ont. Div. Ct.). 
104 Avoidance of constitutional responsibilities through delegation is a key concern in the 
Charter jurisprudence. See Blencoe, supra, note 48 and Godbout, supra, note 48. 
105 See, e.g., Agraira v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), [2013] S.C.J. 
No. 36, 2013 SCC 36, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.). 
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A further point of Indigenous difference in the 2017 cases is 
highlighted by turning our attention to matters of significant debate in the 
Charter context — how and whether the “unformuliac” approach to 
proportionality under the Doré/Loyola framework provides for a 
sufficiently rigorous protection of Charter rights. This framework has 
been repeatedly criticized, including concerns that review of decisions 
for “implicating” Charter values that allow a rights analysis to be 
avoided will lead to diluted and weaker rights protections.106 
Commentators who are more optimistic about this framework note that 
Charter values are distinct from rights and already circumscribe 
administrative discretion, and further that it extends the policy of the 
accessibility of Charter rights by demanding that tribunals attend to 
proportionality in their decisions potentially even before a breach of a 
Charter right has been alleged.107 The commentary was directly 
addressed in LSBC v. TWU. The majority reiterated the ability to achieve 
a “robust proportionality” analysis under the reasonableness standard:  
The framework set out in Doré and Loyola is not a weak or watered 
down version of proportionality — rather, it is a robust one. … [T]he 
reviewing court must be satisfied that the decision proportionately 
balances [the statutory objectives with the Charter protection], that is, 
that it ‘gives effect, as fully as possible to the Charter protections at 
stake given the particular statutory mandate’ (Loyola, at para 39). Put 
another way, the Charter protection must be ‘affected as little as 
reasonably possible’ in light of the applicable statutory objectives 
(Loyola, at para 40). When a decision engages the Charter, 
reasonableness and proportionality become synonymous. Simply put, a 
decision that has a disproportionate impact on Charter rights is not 
reasonable.108 
The dissenting judges, Brown and Côté JJ. were blunt in their 
disagreement, suggesting the debate reinforces their preference for 
applying the tried and true Oakes test “to justify state infringements of 
Charter rights, regardless of the context in which they occur.”109 Chief 
Justice McLachlin and Rowe J. both provided their own concurring 
reasons in which they agreed with the premises of Doré, but suggested a 
                                                                                                                       
106 Macklin, supra, note 9. Other criticisms have included the onus on the party to 
demonstrate reasonableness, which reverses the onus in the court-based approach. 
107 Liston, supra, note 9 comments on the potential obligation on agencies to consider 
Charter values even when not raised by the parties. See also Sossin & Friedman, supra, note 9 and 
Fox-Decent & Pless, supra, note 9. 
108 Supra, note 91, at para. 80 (emphasis in original). 
109 Id., at para. 304. 
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number of refinements to the analytical approach aimed at ensuring that 
the protection of Charter rights in administrative decisions is not lesser 
than the protection in relation to legislative action, including drawing a 
clear line between the notion of a Charter right and a Charter value.110 
The recent LSBC v. TWU decision demonstrates that approach to 
incorporating and reviewing Charter protections in administrative 
discretion is still a livewire.111 With such debate raging, it is odd and 
possibly ill-advised to point out how much better the Doré/Loyola 
framework is than what emerged from the 2017 cases with respect to 
section 35 protections, at least when it comes to protecting the “rights-
quality” of the constitutional rights at stake. But in pursuit of identifying 
and understanding Indigenous differences in public law, I press on. 
Where the Doré/Loyola framework at least calls for a rigorous approach 
to the reasonableness standard, such that proportionality merges with 
reasonableness, the 2017 cases do not even use the word proportionality 
nor is there any analogizing to the justification analysis in section 35 
contexts. Indeed, the Court does not get close to describing or calling for 
a robust approach to the reasonableness standard where an Aboriginal 
rights protection is implicated (otherwise known as when the duty to 
consult has been triggered). As noted above, the Court did not mention 
the reasonableness standard in the cases at all, making it awkward to 
have a discussion of what the reasonableness standard means in this 
context. One might argue that the proportionality inherent in the Haida 
Nation duty to consult — that consultation and accommodation 
obligations increase with the strength of the rights claim in issue and 
potential adverse impact on the rights — was evidenced in the 
Chippewas of the Thames decision, as a whole. As the NEB stated, and 
the Supreme Court repeated, the proposed Line 9 project would occur 
within Enbridge’s existing right of way, resulting in small likelihood of 
impacts on the “rights and interests” of Aboriginal groups.112 In other 
words, the decision-maker (and the Supreme Court) viewed the project 
as having only a small “footprint” on the land, with low stakes for 
Indigenous rights-holders and project mitigation measures adopted to 
address those stakes. However, as argued above, without specifying the 
                                                                                                                       
110 Id., at paras. 111-119, per McLachlin C.J.C. and paras. 162-208, per Rowe J. 
111 Leonid Sirota, for example, calls the majority decision a “catastrophe” in his swift and 
strongly worded blog: “The Supreme Court v the Rule of Law. In ruling against Trinity Western’s 
fundamentalist law school, the Supreme Court unleashes the administrative state” (June 18, 2018), 
online: <https://doubleaspect.blog/2018/06/18/the-supreme-court-v-the-rule-of-law/>. 
112 Chippewas of the Thames, supra, note 2, at para. 23. 
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rights at stake, one cannot know how relevant the fact of a project 
occurring on already disturbed lands might be to its impact on those who 
use or own (or claim to own) those lands, or the measures required to 
address minimal impairment of the right. The gap between the Charter 
context created by not requiring a threshold assessment of the limitations 
on section 35 protections (in the Haida Nation analysis of scope), is thus 
augmented by the lack of any consideration of what a robust 
proportionality analysis akin to a justification test is required in the 
assessment of the adequacy of the consultation process. 
(b) Explaining and Evaluating Difference 
The lack of attention to the nature of a rigorous proportionality 
analysis in relation to section 35 rights protections becomes more stark 
when one observes that Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames 
involved treaty rights, modern and historic respectively. Unlike the 
Aboriginal rights at stake in Haida Nation, treaty rights are not 
“claimed” or “unproven” at law. As Binnie J. wrote for the Court in 
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 
regarding historic treaties, “the Crown, as a party, will always have 
notice of its contents.”113 Having notice of treaty contents in no way 
precludes debate about the scope and application of those treaty rights, or 
whether they are infringed in a given case.114 But there should be no 
debate that at least the harvesting rights at stake in the 2017 cases were 
the subject of fully formed constitutionally protected, section 35 rights. If 
this is correct, then the discussion in the 2017 cases might be expected to 
focus on aligning reasonableness review with the justification of 
infringement test required in relation to treaty rights. In other words, the 
2017 cases were an occasion to consider the merger of the Sparrow115 
and R. v. Badger116 cases on justification with the Doré/Loyola 
framework.  
In Sparrow, a seminal early section 35 case, the parties were able to 
agree at the Supreme Court that the Musqueam, a fishing people, had 
fishing rights as an Indigenous People. The case instead focused on 
                                                                                                                       
113 [2005] S.C.J. No. 71, 2005 SCC 69, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388, at para. 34 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Mikisew Cree”]. 
114 For discussion, see supra, note 71. 
115 Supra, note 17. 
116 [1996] S.C.J. No. 39, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Badger”]. See also R. v. 
Marshall, [1999] S.C.J. No. 66, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533 (S.C.C.). 
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whether those rights had been extinguished prior to 1982 and, given the 
Court’s finding that they had not been extinguished, whether the fishing 
regulations in question unjustifiably infringed Ronald Sparrow’s section 35 
fishing rights.117 In articulating the justification of infringement test, the 
Court borrowed heavily from section 1 of the Charter and the Oakes test in 
spite of no equivalent language existing under the text of section 35.118 
The test that emerged has evolved into a proportionality test, including 
key elements that overlap with the Oakes test to weigh legislative 
objectives against impacts on the rights to ensure that the honour of the 
Crown is substantively (and not just procedurally) upheld before an 
infringement of a section 35 right could be justified. Elements that are 
specific to the section 35 context were also articulated in Sparrow,119 
including consultation with respect to the accommodations required;120 
Indigenous priority with respect to at least subsistence or food, social and 
ceremonial harvesting rights; and, compensation in appropriate 
circumstances. In spite of these differences, assessment of government 
actions in the justification of infringement under section 35 has often 
aligned with section 1 approaches, including the satisfaction of the 
honour of the Crown standard through a lens of “reasonableness”.121 The 
extension of section 1 proportionality was furthered in Badger when 
the Supreme Court adapted the test from Sparrow to allow for justified 
                                                                                                                       
117 For commentary, see Brian Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal and Treaty Rights” 
(2000) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 196; W.I.C. Binnie, “The Sparrow Doctrine: Beginning of the End or End 
of the Beginning?” (1990) 15 Queen’s L.J. 217. 
118 On the justification test as proportionality, see Mark D. Walters, “Respecting Deference 
as Respect: Rights, Reasonableness and Proportionality in Canadian Administrative Law” in Hanna 
Wilberg & Mark Elliott, eds., The Scope and Intensity of Substantive Review: Traversing Taggart’s 
Rainbow (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015) 395 at 401-402, regarding Sparrow, Dwight Newman, 
“The Limitation of Rights: A Comparative Evolution and Ideology of the Oakes and Sparrow Tests” 
(1999) 62 Sask. L. Rev. 543. 
119 The analysis from Sparrow also does not allow the same breadth of “public interest” objectives 
to justify an infringement of a s. 35 right as might be possible under a s. 1 Charter analysis (as applied by 
Vickers J. in Williams v. British Columbia, [2007] B.C.J. No. 1291, 2007 BCSC 853 (B.C.S.C.)). 
However, broader public interest objectives have been held to potentially ground a justification of an 
infringement of an Aboriginal title right or a commercial scale harvesting right: Delgamuukw, supra, note 17; 
Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 88, and R. v. Gladstone, [1996] S.C.J. No. 79, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 (S.C.C.). 
120 It should be noted that other Charter rights with collective dimensions involve 
consultation obligations in the accommodation process and subsequent justification analysis; for 
example, see the freedom of association cases: British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v. British 
Columbia, [2016] S.C.J. No. 49, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 407 (S.C.C.) and Health Services and Support – 
Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 
391 (S.C.C.). For discussion, see Peter Carver, "Comparing Aboriginal and Other Duties to Consult 
in Canadian Law" (2012) 49 Alta. L. Rev. 855. 
121 R. v. Nikal, [1996] S.C.J. No. 47, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013, at para. 110 (S.C.C.). 
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infringements of treaty rights.122 Following Haida Nation, there has been 
some confusion regarding the relationship between these two 
frameworks and particularly whether the consultation obligation was one 
and the same. In 2014, Tsilhqot’in Nation provided clarification that in 
some cases additional consultation would be required following 
recognition of a “claimed right” as an actual constitutional right. 
Tsilhqot’in Nation further confirmed that governments must justify any 
infringement of an Aboriginal right to a strict standard, noting the 
fiduciary duty that applied to the title right in issue in that case.123 
Recent appellate level cases, on the other hand, have suggested that 
the justification of infringement test is no longer available to Indigenous 
treaty parties in the context of regulatory processes. Treaty 8 First 
Nations, for example, argued that both the Federal and Provincial 
Crowns had an obligation to consider the infringement of their treaty 
rights before approving the Site C dam in the Peace River Valley.124 In 
that environmental impact assessment process, the terms of reference for 
the joint federal and provincial review panel explicitly prohibited the 
Panel from commenting on scope of the Treaty rights in issue and their 
infringement.125 Both provincial and federal courts of appeal declined to 
find the approving ministers and cabinet responsible for determining 
more than the adequacy of consultation in the context of the 
environmental impact review.126 In reaching these conclusions, both 
courts analyzed the statutory context with reference to Paul, commenting 
on the Crown’s non-adjudicative function, lack of fact finding role, and 
lack of a proper evidentiary record and fact finding role in these 
                                                                                                                       
122 For a critique of this extension, see Leonard I. Rotman, “Defining Parameters: Aboriginal 
Rights, Treaty Rights, and the Sparrow Justificatory Test” (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 149. 
123 The relevance of the discussion of the justification test in Tsilhqot’in Nation to other 
Aboriginal rights (i.e., not title claims) is a matter of some uncertainty. For related discussion, see 
Peter Hogg & Daniel Styler, “Statutory Limitation of Aboriginal or Treaty rights: What Counts as 
Justification?” (2015-2016) 1 Lakehead L.J. 3. 
124 Prophet River FCA, supra, note 58; Prophet River BCCA, supra, note 58. 
125 Prophet River First Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Environment), [2015] B.C.J. No. 
2026, 2015 BCSC 1682, at para. 35 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Prophet River BCSC”]: “2.5 The Joint 
Review Panel will not make any conclusions or recommendations as to: (a) the nature and scope of 
asserted Aboriginal rights or the strength of those asserted rights; (b) the scope of the Crown’s duty to 
consult Aboriginal Groups; (c) whether the Crown has met its duty to consult Aboriginal Groups …; (d) 
whether the Project is an infringement of Treaty No. 8; and (e) any matter of treaty interpretation.” 
126 This finding does not preclude the need for the Crown to conduct a preliminary assessment of 
the rights and the potential adverse impact on the rights to assess whether consultation was adequate in 
relation to the scope of the obligations, under the Haida Nation analysis as opposed to a treaty rights 
analysis. In these cases, this point was not contentious as deep consultation obligations were admitted and 
consultation and accommodation measures followed and offered matched that assessment. 
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processes,127 factors that are part of the Martin and Paul frameworks for 
determining whether a decision-maker has implied authority over 
constitutional questions.128 But the Federal Court of Appeal went further, 
describing an evolution in the case law whereby the Supreme Court has 
“moved away from” the justification of infringement framework under 
Sparrow to a framework of dialogue about claimed rights under Haida 
Nation,129 and commenting that the Treaty 8 parties were “in reality 
inviting the Court to revert to the pre-Haida Nation case law. 
Specifically, they contend that claimed rights or treaty rights ought to be 
adjudicated by the GIC every time an infringement is alleged by an 
Aboriginal group.”130 It was sufficient in the Prophet River case to decide 
on the basis of no implied authority over the constitutional questions in 
issue, but these comments go further and read as an attack on the logic of 
accessibility of constitutional rights, under Paul and Martin.  
There are further problems raised by the discussion in Prophet River at 
the Federal Court, and in the adoption of reliance approach in the 2017 
cases. First, the logic of Haida Nation overtaking the justification analysis 
is over-extended if applied beyond the “taking up” clauses in issue in 
Prophet River. The taking up clauses are common to the numbered treaties, 
and permit the Crown to take up lands within treaty settlement areas for 
settlement and development, but not in an unlimited manner.131 In 
extending the Haida Nation duty to consult and accommodate to treaty 
rights in Mikisew Cree, the Supreme Court was addressing the 
implementation of these clauses in the treaties specifically: 
                                                                                                                       
127 Prophet River FCA, supra, note 58, at para. 78; Prophet River BCCA, supra, note 58, at 
paras. 22-23 and 27-28. 
128 Martin, supra, note 12, at para. 48; Paul, supra, note 14, at para. 39. These cases raise 
issues of the constitutionality of removing constitutional jurisdictions through intergovernmental 
agreements under legislation, particularly when the authority to consider the constitutional questions 
at stake do not rest with a later decision-maker either. For discussion, see Lambert, supra, note 10. 
And as these cases played out, further access to adjudication of the issues is then denied through 
judicial review, requiring bifurcation of the proceedings — an approach that has generally been 
discouraged in relation to Charter matters (Conway, supra, note 12, at para. 79), but the possibility 
of which has been recognized in the s. 35 context (Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, supra, note 27, at 
paras. 62-63). 
129 Prophet River FCA, supra, note 58, at para. 34. 
130 Id., at para. 57 (emphasis added). 
131 See, for example, the text from Treaty 8: the signatory Indians “shall have right to pursue their 
usual vocations of hunting, trapping and fishing throughout the tract surrendered as heretofore described, 
subject to such regulations as may from time to time be made by the Government of the country, acting 
under the authority of Her Majesty, and saving and excepting such tracts as may be required or taken up 
from time to time for settlement, mining, lumbering, trading or other purposes.” Online: 
<http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100028813/1100100028853#chp4>. For discussion, see Shin 
Imai, “Treaty Lands and Crown Obligations: The ‘Tracts Taken Up’ Provision” (2001) 27 Queen’s L.J. 1. 
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[N]ot every subsequent “taking up” by the Crown constituted an 
infringement of Treaty 8 that must be justified according to the test set 
out in Sparrow. In Sparrow, it will be remembered, the federal 
government’s fisheries regulations infringed the aboriginal fishing right, 
and had to be strictly justified. This is not the same situation as we have 
here, where the aboriginal rights have been surrendered and extinguished, 
and the Treaty 8 rights are expressly limited to lands not “required or 
taken up from time to time for settlement, mining, lumbering, trading or 
other purposes” (emphasis added). The language of the treaty could not 
be clearer in foreshadowing change. Nevertheless the Crown was and is 
expected to manage the change honourably.132 
In Mikisew Cree, the Supreme Court was equally clear that “... [i]f the 
time comes that in the case of a particular Treaty 8 First Nation ‘no 
meaningful right to hunt’ remains over its traditional territories, the 
significance of the oral promise that ‘the same means of earning a 
livelihood would continue after the treaty as existed before it’ would 
clearly be in question, and a potential action for treaty infringement, 
including the demand for a Sparrow justification, would be a legitimate 
First Nation response.”133 The 2017 cases, however, do not fit with this 
line of cases: the treaty rights at stake are different. The historic treaties 
signed by the ancestors of the Chippewas of the Thames are older and at 
least the recorded text is of a significantly different character than the 
post-Confederation numbered treaties, often described as resembling real 
estate transactions.134 The constitutional rights at stake in Clyde River are 
defined under the NCLA, and include harvesting and stewardship 
rights.135 While the Crown’s responsibilities to implement and administer 
both sets of treaties are subject to the honour of the Crown,136 such 
                                                                                                                       
132 Supra, note 113, at para. 31 (emphasis in original). 
133 Id., at para. 48. 
134 J.R. Miller, Compact, Contract, Covenant: Aboriginal Treaty-Making in Canada 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009). On their website, the Chippewas of the Thames First 
Nation list the following as their treaties: The Longwoods Treaty of 1822 (which they note has three 
written versions); The London Township Treaty of 1796; The Sombra Treaty of 1796; Treaty #29 of 
1827; and The McKee Treaty of 1790 (online: <http://www.cottfn.com/chief-council/our-history/>). 
A version of the English text of some of these treaties is available online from the Government of 
Canada: <https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1370372152585/1370372222012>. There are no “taking up” 
clauses in the written text. 
135 Supra, note 20. 
136 Regarding the honour of the Crown applying to modern treaties, see Little 
Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, supra, note 28; regarding the honour of the Crown applying the 
implementation of treaties and other solemn Crown commitments to Indigenous Peoples, see 
Manitoba Metis Federation v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] S.C.J. No. 14, 2013 SCC 14, 
[2013] 1 S.C.R. 623 (S.C.C.). 
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responsibilities cannot rewrite the Constitution and “overtake” the nature 
of the interests at stake as constitutional rights. As constitutional rights, 
these interests are prioritized and restrain both government decisions and 
legislative acts. The proportionality of the duty to consult analysis set out 
in Haida Nation was never intended to usurp the justification analysis. 
Both have their role in protecting section 35 rights and claimed rights.137 
The issue of concern highlighted by the 2017 cases (as well as the Prophet 
River litigation), however, is the relative inaccessibility of the rights 
framework,138 and the lack of discussion of merging the justification 
analysis with the reasonableness standard in the context of section 35 rights 
as is occurring with respect to Charter protections. 
A merged approach to justification of infringement and reasonableness 
analysis in the context of section 35 may raise as many concerns as it 
does in the context of Charter rights. Nevertheless, it would improve the 
“rights quality” of section 35 protections in two ways. First, as discussed 
above and in parallel to the related Charter framework, it would ensure 
that there would be a distinct analysis of the right (or claimed right) 
before the proportionality analysis takes place. As argued above, 
Haida Nation also requires this type of analysis in relation to the 
constitutional questions involved in determining the scope of the duty to 
consult and accommodate (preliminary assessment of the preliminary 
strength of the rights, and the seriousness of any potential impact) and 
would satisfy this step if it were treated as a threshold analysis on 
judicial review (if not also required of a tribunal). But where established 
treaty rights are in issue, and the issue is one of the “disputed” nature and 
scope of the rights rather than a claim to a right not yet established at 
law, the situation is not akin to the treaty issues to which the Haida 
Nation analysis was applied in Mikisew Cree. The situation is instead 
akin to that in LSBC v. TWU, in which the nature and degree of 
infringement of a Charter right was disputed and analyzed before the 
proportionality of the impact of the Law Society’s decision was assessed 
leaning heavily on the final two steps of Oakes. Translating this analysis 
into the treaty rights contexts at stake in Chippewas of the Thames and 
Clyde River, and to properly introduce Doré to Sparrow, a proportionality 
analysis would need to be considered in relation to the statutory 
objectives at stake, in relation to the concepts of minimal impairment and 
                                                                                                                       
137 The relationship between the Haida and Sparrow frameworks was recently revisited by 
the Supreme Court in Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 88. 
138 For related commentary, see Borrows, supra, note 7; and, Stacey, supra, note 7, at 437. 
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Indigenous priority harvesting (with respect to non-commercial activities 
at least), and in relation to the quality of the consultation process that 
proceeded the breach.139 There is overlap with the analysis under Haida 
Nation, since consultation and mitigation measures/conditions adopted in 
response are considered and address, at least partially, two of the 
justification elements. Further, both justification of infringement and 
consultation are measured against standards required to satisfy the 
honour of the Crown. Nevertheless, a focus on justifying a breach of 
treaty rights extends the concept of the honour of the Crown at stake 
beyond the narrowness of a duty to consult, which demands only that a 
meaningful conversation occur.140 The honour of the Crown in relation to 
the justification analysis engages treaty interpretation principles in 
defining the right and its breach, as well as the Crown’s obligations to 
honourably implement and administer treaties, giving rise to a higher 
standard of conduct expected and one that directly engages the treaty 
relationship rather than just an isolated conversation about one project.141 
Thus instead of this engagement with the evolving Charter law, the 2017 
cases adopt only the weakest aspects of the Charter frameworks and 
leave section 35 protections on a different track, one that leaves 
Indigenous parties and observers wondering where one might find and 
realize the rights protections promised under section 35 of the 
Constitution. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Indigenous difference in relation to the treatment of section 35 
protections on judicial review is stark. Constitutional questions and 
responsibilities are not delegated by the legislature to administrative 
                                                                                                                       
139 For a recent discussion of the justification test, see Ahoushat Indian Band v. Canada 
(Attorney General), [2018] B.C.J. No. 717, 2018 BCSC 633 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Ahoushat”]. 
140 Clyde River, supra, note 1; West Moberly First Nations BCCA, supra, note 102. 
141 In relation to title, where the fiduciary duty is engaged once Aboriginal title is proven, the 
Supreme Court described the difference between the obligation in consultation versus justification as 
follows: 
Where Aboriginal title is unproven, the Crown owes a procedural duty imposed by the 
honour of the Crown to consult and, if appropriate, accommodate the unproven Aboriginal 
interest. By contrast, where title has been established, the Crown must not only comply with 
its procedural duties, but must also ensure that the proposed government action is 
substantively consistent with the requirements of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. This 
requires both a compelling and substantial governmental objective and that the government 
action is consistent with the fiduciary duty owed by the Crown to the Aboriginal group. 
 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 88, at para. 80. 
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actors, but rather the Crown can rely on administrative agencies to fulfil 
its unique constitutional obligations. The lack of attention to rigorous 
proportionality and the modification of justification tests to suit 
administrative contexts cannot be explained by the existence of an 
“obligations” framework under Haida Nation, unless one accepts that 
disputed Aboriginal and treaty rights do not have the status of 
constitutional rights. Furthermore, the logic of the accessibility of 
enforcement and adjudication of these rights has not been centred as an 
important and motivating policy direction. As I set out at the beginning 
of this paper, my aim is to question whether there are principles that can 
explain and ground these differences, and whether there are good reasons 
for identifying alternative approaches to section 35 rights. In my view, 
the differences identified above cannot be justified. Although the Crown-
reliance model might be rooted in treaty relationships and previous cases 
that nod towards ongoing and disputed Crown sovereignty, ultimate 
Crown responsibility for consultation as articulated in the 2017 cases 
does not correspond with such roots and directions. In any event, a 
different path is not warranted. Section 35 protections are simply not that 
different from Charter rights. They may be motivated by different aspects 
of the history of the state, with section 35 being rooted in a long 
Indigenous and colonial history in North America and the Charter being 
rooted in the evolution of individual rights and liberties in British, French 
and Euro-Canadian traditions.142 Their political and potentially 
redistributive nature may require courts to be cautious of over-reaching 
to dictate potential negotiated resolutions and settlements of rights 
disputes.143 Nevertheless, the protections against state action, and the 
                                                                                                                       
142 There are, of course, other differences between s. 35 and the Charter to consider. For 
example, the text is quite different, with s. 35 being very bare compared to the Charter. These textual 
differences, however, have been negated by judicial importations of Charter approaches into s. 35. 
One might also identify s. 35 rights as collectively held, in contrast to the individual nature of 
Charter rights. However, this views Charter rights too narrowly, ignoring the collective nature of 
some Charter rights (e.g., s. 2(d), s. 23) and the actively discussed collective nature of other Charter 
rights (s. 15, s. 2(a), for example). More importantly, however, the issues at stake in this discussion 
are structural and about how constitutional rights are implemented and administered by the state. 
The form of the constitutional protection is more important than the qualities of the rights 
themselves. Both s. 35 and the Charter are constitutional rights and that must guide and bind 
government action, and so the argument is that the framework of analysis should be the same 
(subject to a principled basis for difference). 
143 As B.C.S.C. judge Humphries J. said recently in her decision on the lack of justification 
for infringements of commercial fishing rights, 
I have made a series of findings in respect of unjustified infringements, but the result is 
not a workable fishery ready to be implemented, because, as I must emphasize, the court 
cannot design a fishery. The task of allocating fishery resources belongs to the 
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state privilege to limit rights in a proportionate manner in favour of 
broader collective interests, take the same form.  
If Haida Nation; Sparrow; Doré and Oakes were brought into 
conversation with each other, there is potential to advance not only the 
coherence across areas of public law, but also ongoing debates about how 
judicial review conceives of and supports the role of the administrative 
branch in the implementation and administration of constitutional rights. 
For example, one of the most contentious points in the debates about the 
Doré/Loyola framework is it embraces both Charter rights and Charter 
values. In concurring reasons in LSBC v. TWU for example, Rowe J. 
advocated for a strict differentiation of values from rights, reasoning that 
the former come into play where the Charter has no direct application 
and play “a supporting role in the adjudication of Charter claims” but 
“have no independent function in the administrative context. ... When 
courts review administrative decisions for compliance with the Charter, 
Charter rights must be the focus of the inquiry — not Charter values.”144 
The majority, by contrast, insist that a proportionality analysis is engaged 
through the reasonableness standard when an administrative decision 
“engages the Charter by limiting Charter protections — both rights and 
values”.145 As the majority conceives the matter, Charter protections are 
broader if values are included. As the concurring and dissenting judges 
conceive of the matter, the broader approach risks the dilution of Charter 
rights because it is unclear when it is a right or a value at stake, and 
including both creates uncertainty regarding the issues at stake.  
These debates should travel back and forth to the section 35 context, 
with adaptations and insights from the language of section 35 disputes. 
The responsibilities arising from “rights claims” in Haida Nation map 
remarkably well onto Charter values, and attendant debates. Charter 
values have been described as “inchoate”,146 and subject to further 
evolution and development. The rights claims at stake in Haida Nation 
are similarly inchoate, and subject to both further evolution and 
development. In Haida Nation, however, an eventual point of 
determination is foreseen as part of the structure of the pre-proof 
                                                                                                                       
government. … There is much work still to be done by the Department of Fisheries and 
Oceans … and by the plaintiffs. 
 Ahoushat, supra, note 139, at para. 12. The need to work with rights-holders to achieve 
their accommodation and the need for courts to be cautious with respect to budgetary implications of 
their decisions is of course not unique to the s. 35 context. 
144 Supra, note 91, at paras. 166-170. 
145 Id., at para. 58. 
146 Sossin & Friedman, supra, note 9. 
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obligations of government to respect these rights as claims. The value of 
this obligation is thus prospective. As Binnie J. described in Little 
Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, “Haida Nation attempted to head off 
such confrontations [over the consequences of rights infringements] by 
imposing on the parties a duty to consult and (if appropriate) 
accommodate” where impacts on claims that may become rights are 
apparent.147 Charter values also, minimally, provide prospective guidance 
in administrative decision-making. Indeed, in relation to adjudicative and 
other discretionary decisions, a breach of a right cannot usually be 
established until the decision has been made. As the Supreme Court 
defined in Baker, administrative discretion “must be exercised in 
accordance with the boundaries imposed in the statute, the principles of 
the rule of law, the principles of administrative law, the fundamental 
values of Canadian society, and the principles of the Charter.”148 Thus, 
both section 35 and Charter protections have meaning and offer direction 
to administrative decision-makers before there is a decision that arguably 
breaches a constitutional right. And as in Baker and Clyde River, judicial 
review on the basis of values or “potential” rights claims may, in some 
cases, be sufficient to provide the necessary remedy.149  
The difficulty with values and prospective rights is in ensuring that a 
party has access to adjudication of their constitutional rights where the 
constitutional weight of a potential right or a guiding value does not 
provide a remedy, and obscures a dispute about the violation of an actual 
right. Once the decision is made, and a breach of a right alleged by a 
party, then the latest discussion of the Charter framework seems 
relatively clear that on judicial review, courts will examine whether a right 
is at stake, and not simply a value.150 On this point, however, Chippewas 
                                                                                                                       
147 Supra, note 28, at para. 53. 
148 Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 39, [1999] 
2 S.C.R. 817, at para. 56 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Baker”]. 
149 With thanks to the anonymous reviewer for the suggestion, it would be productive to also 
consider similarities and differences with respect to the remedies available for administrative 
breaches of Charter rights and values and breaches of the duty to consult. While fuller discussion is 
beyond the coverage in this paper, it can be noted that Clyde River confirmed that the quashing of a 
decision is the appropriate remedy for inadequate consultation, aligning with familiar approaches 
from administrative law. See Bankes, supra, note 6, for comment. 
150 For example, LSBC v. TWU, supra, note 91; Ktunaxa Nation, supra, note 60, and 
Promislow 2018, supra, note 66. The complaint has been that when a party advances Charter 
argument, it is unpredictable when a court will pursue a Charter analysis of an administrative law 
analysis, as the Supreme Court did in Baker, supra, note 148. See discussion in Fox-Decent & Pless, 
supra, note 8, and Liston, supra, note 9. It remains to be seen whether recent clarifications in LSBC 
v. TWU will effectively address this uncertainty and inconsistency. 
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of the Thames demonstrates that the relatively undeveloped section 35 
framework falls flat, illustrating the dangers and concerns of the “values” 
critics that constitutional rights might lose their rights-quality; that is, as 
a constitutional restraint on government action that calls for rigorous 
justification when violated. 
What remains underdeveloped in both the Charter and section 35 
contexts is the sticking point of adjudicating and reviewing decisions that 
impact the more inchoate Charter values or rights claims that are not yet 
and may never be recognized as a right. Haida Nation offers the view of 
proportionality in those circumstances, and suggests that the eventual 
recognition of a right and its violation is not necessary to consider the 
constitutional interests at stake. If rights claims are capable of 
preliminary assessments, so is the weight and strength of a Charter value 
in a given circumstance. As discussed above, the biggest problem with 
proportionality under the Haida Nation analysis is that on judicial 
review, courts have failed to insist on a specific review of the scoping 
exercise that embeds proportionality in the articulation of the depth of 
the obligation to consult and accommodate in a given case. Further, the 
third step of assessing the adequacy of the consultation process through 
the reasonableness standard might itself be enriched and strengthened by 
incorporating a values approach that considers the statutory objectives 
advanced by the government or tribunal decision in a final balancing 
with its impacts on the reconciliation objectives of section 35 and the 
survival and flourishing of Indigenous Peoples, cultures and lands that 
motivate the individual rights within the section 35 context.151  
Finally, the section 35 context would benefit from attention to the 
concerns for accessibility of rights protections that motivate judicial review 
of the administration of Charter rights. Part of this accessibility is the 
avoidance of bifurcation of proceedings, directions that are supported by 
allowing rights disputes to be adjudicated through judicial review 
proceedings even where the rights dispute was not fully articulated or treated 
at the first level of decision. Where recent developments in the Charter 
context suggest that adjudication of the scope and breach of a Charter right 
is available on judicial review (as noted above), the section 35 context has 
                                                                                                                       
151 See, e.g., Brian Slattery, “The Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights” (2007) 38 
S.C.L.R. 595. See also Kainaiwa/Blood Tribe v. Alberta (Minister of Energy), [2017] A.J. No. 149, 
2017 ABQB 107 (Alta. Q.B.), regarding reconciliation and honour of the Crown in the reasonableness 
analysis. 
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moved towards greater bifurcation of proceedings.152 As the Supreme Court 
majority stated in Ktunaxa Nation, it is “not for courts to make far-reaching 
constitutional declarations in the course of judicial review proceedings 
incidental to, and ill-equipped to determine, Aboriginal rights and title 
claims”.153  
Section 35 rights are thus peripheral to judicial review of 
administrative action, and unlike the Charter (and the Supreme Court’s 
statement in Paul), the fact that the machinery of government makes 
daily decisions that affect and potentially affect Aboriginal rights has no 
bearing on ability of Indigenous Peoples to pursue the enforcement of 
their rights before tribunals (as well as courts). Instead, these comments 
suggest that courts (and tribunals) are fixated on the difficulties and time 
involved in historical evidence and proofs required by the Aboriginal and 
treaty rights tests. These “practical” concerns under Martin and Paul play 
a role in deciding the constitutional jurisdictions on judicial review (and 
therefore the record available to the courts on judicial review), but these 
concerns are expected to be weighed against overriding concerns for 
accessibility.154 Moreover, such concerns may be overstated in relation to 
what may be required of a court to make rights adjudication accessible 
on judicial review. Not every rights dispute demands adjudication of the 
proof of a right; judicial review of the scope and nature of a right claimed 
to be breached may be sufficient to provide direction to administrative 
decision-makers and to observe on judicial review that a decision is 
reasonable or unreasonable in its attention to the nature of the rights at 
stake and therefore what is or is not a proportional impact on those 
rights. Even if the evidentiary burdens and concerns in the section 35 
context are qualitatively different from the Charter context, these features 
make the adjudication of section 35 rights even less accessible than 
Charter rights, particularly in the continued absence of government and 
legislative action to create specialized forms for the adjudication and 
                                                                                                                       
152 See, e.g., the evolution of the Prophet River litigation (supra, note 58), in which the 
Treaty 8 communities of Prophet River and West Moberly have now launched civil proceedings 
seeking a declaration of an unjustified infringement of their Treaty rights and seeking an injunction 
to stop construction on the Site C damn in the meantime; pleadings available online: Sage Legal, 
<https://www.sagelegal.ca/new-page/>. 
153 Supra, note 60, at para. 86. For commentary, see Promislow 2018, supra, note 66. 
154 Another potential objection to adjudication of rights disputes not treated by the 
administrative decision-maker is the limitation of judicial review to review of the record that was 
before the decision-maker at first instance. Here, there are limited exceptions to allow for new 
evidence to be entered on judicial review in both constitutional contexts. For discussion, see Ktunaxa 
Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operation), [2014] 
B.C.J. No. 584, 2014 BCSC 568, at paras. 113-134 (B.C.S.C.). 
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recognition of Aboriginal rights.155 The answer is not for courts to wait 
for governments to act; attention to the rights claims and disputes at stake 
in the section 35 context is required to push governments towards action. 
These considerations bolster the arguments for leaning on approaches 
taken in relation to the administration of Charter rights in the section 35 
context. There are many points upon which courts can appropriately 
intervene on judicial review without overstepping their institutional 
competence, provided that section 35 protections are understood as full-
fledged constitutional rights. If such actions are sufficiently inconvenient 
for governments, governments might then, finally, be prompted to act to 
create the forums required to address ongoing disputes about the nature, 
scope and existence of Aboriginal and treaty rights, and act in concert 
with Indigenous Peoples who, at least under the United Nations 
Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples, have a right to be consulted 
about legislation that will impact them and their rights.156 In short, there 
is much to be gained by maintaining the conversation between section 35 
and Charter law when it comes to the implementation and administration 
of rights. While sui generis approaches have their place in the section 35 
canon,157 new concepts like “Crown reliance” and avoiding rights 
frameworks through elliptical and partial borrowings from Charter 
contexts are not part of the sui generis canon. Instead, further 
development of the judicial review principles that apply in review of 
government decisions affecting section 35 rights and rights claims, and 
further attention to the merger of proportionality and reasonableness are 
called for to serve both reconciliation purposes and strengthen 
Indigenous parties’ access to the rule of law. 
                                                                                                                       
155 Government of Canada, “Government of Canada to create Recognition and 
Implementation of Rights Framework”, Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada Website 
(February 14, 2018): <https://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2018/02/14/government-canada-create-recognition-
and-implementation-rights-framework>. The Trudeau government’s proposal has met with 
opposition from First Nations and resulted in commitments to continue to work on the framework 
before introducing legislation: Jorge Barrera, “Promised Indigenous rights recognition legislation 
won’t be in place before next election” CBC News (November 14, 2018), online: <https://www.cbc. 
ca/news/indigenous/fn-rights-framework-1.4905705>. 
156 61/295, 107th Plenary Meeting, September 13, 2007, Article 19. The Mikisew Cree’s 
recent attempt to define a similar obligation under s. 35 failed: Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada 
(Governor General in Council), [2018] S.C.J. No. 40, 2018 SCC 40 (S.C.C.). It might also be noted 
that, under the Sparrow justification test, government must consult in advance of impacts on 
(established) rights by legislation in order to justify any resulting infringement. 
157 See, for example, John Borrows & Leonard I. Rotman, “The Sui Generis Nature of 
Aboriginal Rights: Does it Make a Difference?” (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 9. 
